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A. In Personam Jurisdiction
C URRENTLY, 106 product liability actions are pending
in the Southern District of Texas that stem from em-
ployment-related exposure to asbestos at the Uvalde Rock
Asphalt Company in Houston.' One of those cases is Ir-
ving v. Owens Coming Fiber Glass Corp. 2 The plaintiff, Irving,
a former Uvalde employee, sued the supplier of raw as-
, Irving v. Owens Corning Fiber Glass Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 384 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 83 (1989).
2 864 F.2d at 383.
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bestos under the theories of strict liability, negligence,
and breach of warranty for respiratory injuries allegedly
linked to asbestos exposure. The raw asbestos supplier,
a Yugoslavian manufacturer, supplied approximately
5000 metric tons of asbestos to the plaintiff's employer
annually from 1956 to 1970.4
To establish jurisdiction in a diversity case, the plaintiff
must satisfy both the forum state's long-arm statute and
the fourteenth amendment's due process requirements.5
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the plaintiff established a prima facie case for per-
sonal jurisdiction over the Yugoslavian defendant.6 In de-
termining the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant, the due process clause permits a
district court to exercise in personam jurisdiction when (1)
the defendant has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the
forum, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ' 7
The minimum contacts must arise from actions of the
nonresident defendant who "purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws." The Supreme Court has determined, in describ-
ing the degree of purposeful conduct necessary to satisfy
the minimum contacts prong of the due process clause,
that "the forum state does not exceed its power under the
due process clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a
corporation that delivers its products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum state."9 In World-
Wide Volkswagen, the court stressed that foreseeability for
Id. at 384.
4Id.
5 Id. at 385 (citing De Melo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1264 (5th
Cir. 1983)).
6 Id. at 387.
7 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
8 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980).
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personal jurisdiction purposes turns on whether "the de-
fendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are
such that [it] should reasonably anticipate being hailed
into court there."' 0
The Irving court noted that the Supreme Court's most
recent statement on personal jurisdiction was found in
Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court,' in which four
justices favored a narrow interpretation of the stream of
commerce doctrine. The court, however, chose not to
rely on Asahi, concluding that the "splintered view of min-
imum contacts" expressed in Asahi provided no clear gui-
dance on the issue. The court chose, instead, to use the
stream of commerce standard described in World-Wide
Volkswagen. This is the traditional approach of the Fifth
Circuit.' 2
In Irving, the defendant contended that its role in the
distribution chain was too minor to vest the district court
with personal jurisdiction under the stream of commerce
doctrine."' The appeals court disagreed, however, noting
that the defendant held itself out as a seller in the con-
tract, shared the cost of quality control testing by a Hous-
ton lab, accepted payments for the asbestos, and stored
the product. ' 4 These actions satisfied the minimum con-
tacts prong of the due process test. The court noted that
even a nonresident defendant's out-of-state activities can
establish the necessary minimum contacts if those activi-
ties have "reasonably foreseeable consequences" within
the forum state. ' 5 The Irving court also found that the ju-
risdiction over the asbestos supplier would not violate the
essential standards of fair play and substantial justice.' 6
The defendant's argument stressed that under the Fifth
Circuit's formulation it would carry a heavy burden as a
lo Id. at 297.
" 480 U.S. 102 (1987).




16 Id. at 387.
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foreign company defending lawsuits in Texas.' 7 The de-
fendant also noted the Supreme Court's comment in Asahi
to give "significant weight" to the unique burdens placed
on parties who face litigation in a foreign legal system.' 8
But the court, in citing Asahi, concluded that when mini-
mum contacts have been established, often the interests
of the plaintiff and the forum will justify the serious bur-
den placed upon the alien defendant. Therefore, the
court concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice.' 9
In Insurance Co. of North America v. Judge, ° the district
court originally held that the owners of a Piper Cherokee
Archer single-engine aircraft, although residents of Illi-
nois, had the requisite minimum contacts with Minnesota
to be subject to personal jurisdiction in that forum.2' At
that time, the court found that the defendants were sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction on the grounds that they pur-
posely served the market for interstate travel by leasing
the airplane in Illinois to an airplane rental agency, with-
out imposing any restrictions on the airplane's use.2 2 The
court, however, decided to reconsider its previous deci-
sion 23 in light of the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Asahi, a case which had not been cited by either
party in earlier jurisdictional motions. 4
On reconsideration, the Minnesota District Court con-
cluded it could not assert jurisdiction over the defendant.
Because of the Eighth Circuit's narrow view of the stream-
of-commerce theory, the court was unable to sustain juris-




20 20 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,594 (D.C. Minn. 1987).
2 1 See id. at 18,596-98.
22 Id. at 18,598.
2, 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,776, 17,781 (D.C. Minn. 1988). The court noted that
its reversal was "in light of Asahi." Id. at 17,779.
24 See id. at 17,780.
6 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [56
renting an airplane to third parties in Illinois, which sub-
sequently caused injury in Minnesota, they had sufficient
contact with Minnesota to be subject to jurisdiction
there.2 5 Merely placing a product in the stream of com-
merce, even if it was foreseeable that the product would
find its way into the forum state, was not sufficient without
an act purposely directed at the forum state. Instead,
what is required is additional conduct by the defendant
manifesting "an intent or purpose to serve the market in
the forum state," such as marketing or advertising activi-
ties directed at the forum.26 Because the defendants did
not seek, either directly or indirectly, to serve the Minne-
sota market for airplane travel or rentals by advertising or
other marketing techniques, they were not subject to the
jurisdiction of the Minnesota courts.27
The court further concluded that there was no agency
relationship between the pilot and the owners where the
pilot was not acting on the owner's behalf and was not
under his control.28 Accordingly, the crash of the airplane
in Minnesota could not be imputed to the owners as a
contact with that forum under agency law principles. The
court looked to automobile-related case law from other
jurisdictions which supported the conclusion that statutes
making the car owner vicariously liable for the negligence
of drivers do not provide an independent basis for
jurisdiction. 9
In Eason v. Linden Avionics,3 ° the district court found that
the defendant, a manufacturer of an aircraft that departed
from New Jersey and crashed in Rhode Island, had suffi-
cient minimum contacts with the state of New Jersey to
25 Id.
26 Id. (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 17,780-81.
29 Id. The court cited supporting cases: Walenta v. Avis Rent-A-Car System,
Inc., 10 Conn. App. 201, 522 A.2d 820 (1987); Finkbiner v. Mullins, 532 A.2d 609
(Del. Super. Ct. 1987); Stroman v. Brown, 194 NJ. Super. 307, 476 A.2d 874
(1984); DeArmon v. B. Mears Corp., 67 N.C. App. 640, 314 S.E.2d 124 (1984).
so 706 F. Supp. 311 (D.N.J. 1989).
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render it amenable to personal jurisdiction in New
Jersey." Although the defendant had intentionally struc-
tured its business activity to avoid being subject to the ju-
risdiction of states in which its products could be found,
its contacts with New Jersey were sufficiently purposeful,
continuous, and substantive to render it subject to the fo-
rum state's jurisdiction.3 2
The defendant contended its contacts with New Jersey
were insufficient to support either jurisdiction or venue in
that district. The company conducted the bulk of its busi-
ness outside the state, did not maintain manufacturing,
sales, warehouse, or other facilities in New Jersey, owned
no property in New Jersey, had no offices or employees in
New Jersey, and had not authorized a New Jersey agent to
accept service of process. The only contact with New
Jersey arose from its use of the New Jersey market for the
sale of its airplane. 3
The court found that the defendant placed an interme-
diary agent between its company and the ultimate con-
sumer of its products which enabled it to enjoy the
benefits of New Jersey's legal forum and protection. By
sending company representatives to New Jersey, the de-
fendant provided service to local customers and fully de-
veloped its business relationship with the state. By
soliciting business in New Jersey, the defendant affirma-
tively and independently invoked the benefits of the laws
of the forum state. It was, therefore, subject to the per-
sonal jurisdiction of New Jersey. 4
.1 Id. at 324. The court relied on Asahi, saying that the placement of a produci
into the stream of commerce suffices to establish the requisite minimum contacu
for personal jurisdiction where the defendant's conduct indicates an intent or pur.
pose to serve the market in the forum state. An intent to serve the market mighi
be evidenced by, for example, designing a product for the market, advertising
establishing channels for providing advice to customers, or marketing through
distributor. Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. Beech characterized its advertising activities as "intermittent", arguinj
that these activities were concentrated in aviation and business magazines witl
national and international circulation. Id.
.4 Id. "Beech expected that its products would be sold in New Jersey and it:
1990]
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In Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corporation,35 the plaintiff
filed an action for personal injuries against defendants
Ernst Home Center Corporation [hereinafter Ernst] and
Pay N'Save. Plaintiff was injured by a maul which was
manufactured by Hirota Tekko K.K., a Japanese manufac-
turer. Hirota sold the maul to Okada Hardware of Japan
for export to the United States. Okada exported the maul
to Mansour, a California corporation, who then sold it to
Pacific Marine Schwabacher, its regional distributor.
Schwabacher distributed and sold the mauls to retailers
throughout the West Coast and Mountain area, including
Ernst.36
Plaintiff filed an action for personal injuries against de-
fendants Ernst and Pay N'Save and amended its com-
plaint, naming Mansour, Okada, and Hirota as
defendants. Mansour, Ernst, and Pay N'Save filed third-
party complaints against Okada and Hirota. Hirota and
Okada each filed motions to dismiss all the claims against
them on the grounds that the trial court lacked personal
jurisdiction over them.
The trial court concluded that the Japanese defendants
lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Utah to warrant
the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction for the injury alleged
by the plaintiff because they had not purposefully availed
themselves of Utah's forum. The plaintiff and Mansour
contended that the state of Utah had jurisdiction over the
Japanese defendants under the stream of commerce
theory.38
The facts revealed that Hirota and Okada had been in-
formed of potential sales in the southwestern United
States, but they never came to Utah nor sent sales repre-
sentatives to Utah to facilitate the marketing and purchas-
purposeful contacts with this state contributed to the orchestration of those
sales." Id.
35 779 P.2d 659 (Utah 1989).
-I Id. at 660.
37 Id.
- Id. at 661.
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ing of their product.3 9 The court concluded that an
intentional and knowing distribution of a product in the
western United States was not sufficient to satisfy the
"minimum contacts" requirement. Neither Hirota nor
Okada had any sales representatives or other agents, bank
accounts, or personal property in Utah. Without the
showing of "additional conduct," the court was unable to
find that eventual sales of a product in Utah justified per-
sonal jurisdiction. Both companies' principal place of
business was Japan, and they did not take advantage of
the state's business climate or the protection of its laws.
Therefore, they did not purposefully avail themselves of
the privilege of conducting activities in Utah.4 °
The mere possibility that a maul might be taken into
Utah was insufficient to make Hirota and Okada subject to
Utah's jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court, in World-
Wide Volkswagen, made it clear that a seller of chattels does
not "appoint the chattel his agent for service of pro-
cess." '41 The Japanese defendants merely manufactured
and distributed a product which ultimately caused injury
in Utah. Thus, the injury alone could not satisfy the due
process requirements for the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion.42 The appeals court affirmed the trial court's dismis-
sal of the complaint.4 3
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
1. General
In Blum v. Airport Terminal Services, Inc.,44 a Missouri
court of appeals upheld a lower court's dismissal of a
complaint against Skycraft, the owner of a DC-3 cargo
plane. Skycraft also employed both the pilot and copilot
of the plane. Due to the misfueling of the aircraft, it
.19 Id. at 665.
40 Id. at 667.
41 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
42 Parry, 779 P.2d at 667.
4 id. at 668.
44 Blum, 762 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
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crashed and the copilot, a Canadian citizen, was killed.
His parents brought a wrongful death action against four
defendants, including Skycraft. Defendant Skycraft filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because the workers' compen-
sation law furnished the exclusive remedy against it. The
trial court granted that motion.45
Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed an amended petition
against the remaining defendants, omitting the owner of
the aircraft as a defendant. Skycraft contended that the
amended petition constituted a waiver or abandonment of
the plaintiffs' right to appeal the court's action in dis-
missing Skycraft.46 The general rule in Missouri is that an
amended petition operates as an abandonment of the
original petition. The plaintiffs asserted that the motion
was improperly granted because the petition on its face
did not establish that the copilot's death was covered by
the Worker's Compensation Act (WCA).4 7 They relied
upon McLeod v. Marion Laboratories, Inc. ,48 which held that
all jurisdictional facts bringing a plaintiff and a defendant
under the WCA must appear in the petition where the is-
sue is raised by motion to dismiss. The petition in Blum
specifically stated that the deceased was Skycraft's em-
ployee. There was nothing before the court to evidence
the inapplicability of the WCA.49
The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the complain-
ants did not abandon their cause of action against the
owner of the aircraft by filing the amended petition. Even
though the deceased and Skycraft were residents of Onta-
rio, Canada, and the employment contract had its situs in
Canada, the trial court did not err in applying Missouri
law rather than Ontario law. 50 Under a choice of law de-
termination, the most significant contacts were in Onta-
45 Id. at 71.
46 Id.
47 Id.
4m 600 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
49 Blum, 762 S.W.2d at 71.
o Id. at 72.
[56
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rio. Under Ontario law, the plaintiffs elected by filing
their suit against Skycraft in Missouri to claim compensa-
tion under the laws of Missouri. Therefore, Missouri law
restricted them to worker's compensation remedies.5
In 0'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc. ,52 a denied boarding
case, the plaintiff held a valid flight ticket issued by Chap-
arral Airlines for passage between Portland, Maine, and
Alexandria, Louisiana. The trip was comprised of three
flight segments.5 After boarding for the final segment,
the plaintiff became loud, boisterous, and intoxicated.
During the ensuing events, the airline found an irregular-
ity in the the plaintiff's ticket. A flight attendant asked the
plaintiff to deplane in order to check with the gate agent
regarding the ticket mix-up. The plaintiff refused to
deplane. The police removed him from the plane,
charged him with disorderly conduct, and jailed him. 4
The plaintiff brought an action against Chaparral Air-
lines, asserting various state law claims based on the
plaintiff's alleged wrongful exclusion from the flight. Di-
versity of citizenship provided the basis for jurisdiction.
After a trial, the jury returned a verdict awarding the
plaintiff $260,273.23 in damages. The court denied the
defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and motion to dismiss. The district court then en-
tered judgment on the jury's verdict, and the defendant
appealed.5
The defendant argued that the state law claims which
formed the basis of the plaintiff's actions were pre-
empted by federal law. The Fifth Circuit held that the
federal trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
the plaintiff's complaint, since state claims are pre-
empted by federal law. The appeals court found three in-
stances where federal law pre-empts state law. First, Con-
1 Id.
52 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1989).
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gress may expressly pre-empt state law. Second,
congressional intent to pre-empt state law may be in-
ferred from the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory
scheme. Third, when state law conflicts with federal law
and interferes with the achievement of congressional
objectives, pre-emption occurs even though state law may
not be displaced in its entirety. The existence of any of
these circumstances is sufficient to establish preemp-
tion.56 Noting that the Federal Aviation Act (the Act)57
applies to the regulation of air travel, the court found that
section 1305, entitled "Federal Preemption," expressly
preempted state law.58 The Act reads in pertinent part as
follows: "No state ... shall enact or enforce any law, rule,
regulation, standard, or other provision having the force
and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of
any carrier having authority under subchapter IV of this
chapter to provide air transportation. '59 In view of this
explicit manifestation of congressional intent, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were pre-empted by
section 1305, and thus, the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the action. The judgment of the
district court was vacated.60
In Sierra Club v. Skinner,61 the Sierra Club filed a com-
plaint seeking judicial review of Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) designation of the Hart Military
Operations Area as a military operations zone. The dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that
exclusive jurisdiction to review FAA actions was vested in
the circuit court of appeals.62
The Sierra Club contended that it was misled by the
FAA handbook into believing that the designation of the
-f See Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargain-
ing Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984) (summarizing the three types of pre-emption).
.1 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1988).
58 Id.
5 Id.
O'Carroll, 863 F.2d at 13.
885 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989).
112 Id. at 592; see 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1982).
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zone was not an order reviewable only under section
1486(a). The Sierra Club also argued that even had it
known the designation was an order, it would have been
difficult to file a petition for review within sixty days of the
FAA decision, because the FAA did not notify these appli-
cants, or any one else who commented on the proposal,
that it had taken final action on the proposed zone. Fi-
nally, the Sierra Club argued that, in the interest of jus-
tice, the court should grant its application so it would
have a forum in which to seek judicial review.63 The court
concluded, however, that there had been no showing of a
reasonable ground for failure to file the petition for judi-
cial review in a court of appeals within sixty days of the
entry of the FAA order, as required by federal statute.
The court found that the FAA's action in designating the
military operations area constituted a final review of the
agency's order.6 4 The agency's action was "final," giver
the substantial administrative record and the formalit)
and specificity of the decision document. The federal trial
court properly dismissed the Sierra Club's complaint foi
lack of jurisdiction, and application for leave to file a latei
petition for review was denied.65
2. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
In Burke v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,66 the defend
ant, Air France, was a corporation owned almost com
pletely by the government of the Republic of France.6
The court found the defendant to be an instrumentality 0
France, pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunitie
Act (FSIA),68 and thus subject to its provisions.69 Unde
FSIA there is no immunity from the jurisdiction of Unite
States courts for actions based on commercial activity of
6, Sierra Club, 885 F.2d at 593.
'Id.
"' Id. at 594.
699 F. Supp. 1016 (D.P.R. 1988).
' Id. at 1019.
- 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988).
69 Burke, 699 F. Supp. at 1019.
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foreign state. The court found that the operation of the
airline was squarely within the commercial activity excep-
tion; therefore, jurisdiction over the defendant, a foreign
state, was proper pursuant to section 1330(a).70
The plaintiffs did not have to satisfy any requisite juris-
dictional amount since the court based its jurisdiction on
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The court al-
lowed the plaintiffs to recover, under Puerto Rico's Civil
Code, for mental anguish and anxiety suffered when de-
fendant's aircraft developed engine trouble, even though
the plaintiffs sustained no physical injuries. 7'
In America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd. ,72 the
Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly dis-
missed a suit in which an airline sought to recover dam-
ages allegedly arising from faulty engine maintenance
work performed in Ireland by a foreign corporation. The
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 73 The lawsuit arose
from damages sustained by America West Airlines when
the engine of one of its aircraft stalled and caught fire
shortly after takeoff. America West alleged that it suffered
damages in excess of $500,000.00 due to the loss of the
engine.7 4
The aircraft purchase agreement between America
West and GPA Leasing, a corporation organized and ex-
isting under the laws of Netherlands Antilles, provided
that America West would purchase a Boeing 737-200 jet
aircraft. Further, America West agreed to replace the fit-
ted engines on the aircraft with two overhauled engines.
The agreement provided that Arizona law would govern
its interpretation. Prior to shipment, Airmotive Ireland,
Ltd. serviced, inspected, repaired, and overhauled one of
the engines.75
70 Id. at 1019; see 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988).
11 Burke, 699 F. Supp. at 1020.
72 877 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1989).
7. Id. at 802.
7. Id. at 795.
7 Id.
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The district court concluded that it lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over this action. With respect to the
claims against Airmotive and Aerlinte (another defend-
ant), the only basis for federal jurisdiction asserted by
America West was the jurisdiction provision of the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act. 76 This provision creates
original jurisdiction without regard to the amount in con-
troversy for any nonjury civil action against a foreign state
as defined in section 1603(a)." This jurisdiction is for any
claim for relief in in personam where the foreign state is not
entitled to immunity under any applicable international
agreement.78
It was undisputed that Aerlinte and Airlingus were com-
pletely owned by the Republic of Ireland and fell within
the definition of a "foreign state" under § 1603(a). The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides that a foreign
state and its instrumentalities are immune from suit, un-
less one of several specific exceptions applies. 79
America West asserted that one or more of the com-
mercial activities exceptions outlined in section
1605(a)(2) divested the defendants of sovereign immu-
nity. 0 The fact that the Republic of Ireland carried on
commercial activities in the United States was, in itself, in-
sufficient to create jurisdiction under the first clause of
§ 1605(a)(2). The court recognized there must be a
76 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
77 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1988).
71 Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
79 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605-1607; see also Virlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Ni-
geria, 461 U.S. 480, 485 n.5 (1983).
go 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988). The section provides, in pertinent part:
(a) a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States or of the. States in any case ...
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act per-
formed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the for-
eign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect on the United
States.
1990]
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nexus between the defendant's commercial activity in the
United States and the plaintiff's grievances. The court
found no nexus between America West's cause of action
and any commercial activity carried on by the Republic of
Ireland in the United States. The only commercial activity
allegedly carried on in the United States by the Republic
of Ireland was Aerlinte's operation of commercial passen-
ger airline service between the United States and Ire-
land."' America West's claim, however, did not relate to
Aerlinte's commercial operation. The specific act that
formed the basis of the suit was the engine maintenance
of Airmotive, which took place solely in Ireland. Thus,
the first clause of section 1605(a)(2) did not divest the
three defendants of sovereign immunity. 2
America West also argued that the third clause of sec-
tion 1605(a)(2), excepting "an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity
elsewhere [which] causes a direct effect in the United
States," divested Aerlinte and Airlingus of sovereign im-
munity.8 3 America West contended that the financial
losses it incurred as a result of Airmotive's allegedly faulty
maintenance constituted a "direct effect" for the purpose
of section 1605(a)(2). a4
The court held that the foreign sovereign's activities
must cause an effect in the United States which is substan-
tial and foreseeable in order to abrogate sovereign immu-
nity. Mere financial loss incurred by a native corporation
does not, in itself, constitute "direct effect" for purposes
of section 1605(a)(2). From Airmotive's standpoint, it
was not foreseeable that its maintenance activities in Ire-
land would have an effect in the United States. When Air-
motive performed the work, the engine was still owned
by GPA Group, Ltd.8 5 In effect, their United States con-
81 America West, 877 F.2d at 797.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 798; see also supra note 80.
84 Id. at 797.
" Id. at 800.
[56
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tacts were purely fortuitous, in that they depended solely
on the fact that the injured corporation happened to be in
America. The appeals court upheld the district court's
determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. 1330(a). 6 Finally, the appeals court
found the trial court had not abused its discretion in de-
ciding the jurisdictional issue without allowing additional
time for discovery and in refusing to allow America West
to amend its complaint.8 7
3. Federal Tort Claims Act
In Nicholson Air Service, Inc. v. United States, 8 the owner
of an airplane involved in a crash brought an action under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 9 The district court
declared that it was not deprived of subject matter juris-
diction over the suit merely because the insurer of the air-
craft, instead of the owner, had filed an administrative
claim with the FAA. 90 The plaintiff alleged that the
United States was liable because of a navigational aid
maintained by the Federal Aviation Administration. The
district court held there was absolutely no substantive dif-
ference between what the insurer asserted in its adminis-
trative claim before the FAA and the claim asserted in this
suit.9" The court held that the government's argument
embodied an archaic conceptualization of subject matter
jurisdiction, which was contrary to the spirit, purpose, and
policy of the federal rules. Accordingly, the court denied
the government's motion to dismiss, and the insured was
substituted for the owner as plaintiff in this suit, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a). 92
In Finley v. United States,93 a plane carrying petitioner's
g6 Id.
87 Id. at 801.
81 686 F. Supp. 538 (D. Md. 1988).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
- Nicholson, 686 F. Supp. at 538.
91 Id. at 538-39.
" Id. at 539.
93 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).
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husband and two of her children struck an electric trans-
mission line and crashed during its approach in San Di-
ego, California.94 Petitioner brought an action in state
court, claiming that San Diego Gas and Electric Company
had negligently positioned and inadequately illuminated
the transmission lines and that the City of San Diego's
negligent maintenance of the runway lights had rendered
them inoperative the night of the crash.95 When the peti-
tioner discovered that the FAA was, in fact, responsible
for the runway lights, she filed an action against the fed-
eral government in the United States District Court, bas-
ing jurisdiction on the FTCA. 6 Plaintiff alleged the FAA
was negligent in the operation and maintenance of the
runway lights and in its performance of air traffic control
functions.97 A year later, plaintiff moved to amend her
federal complaint to include claims against the original
state court defendants, as to which no independent basis
for federal jurisdiction existed. The district court granted
petitioner's motion and asserted pendent jurisdiction
under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.98 The court found it
clear that judicial economy and efficiency favored trying
the actions together and concluded that they arose "from
a common nucleus of operative facts." 99
The district court certified an interlocutory appeal to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but that court summa-
rily reversed on the basis of its earlier opinion in Ayala v.
United States,'00 in which the court had categorically re-
jected pendent party jurisdiction under the FTCA."'0 The
circuits were split on whether the FTCA permitted an as-
sertion of pendent jurisdiction over additional parties, so
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Finley to resolve
I" d. at 2005.
I' d.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
117 Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2005.
i" 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
- Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2005.
,o 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
- Id. at 1197.
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the dispute. 0 2
The Supreme Court did not allow the plaintiff to add
state tort law claims against the city and utility company
with regard to her action against the federal government
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Court found that
the language of the FTCA gives federal district courts ex-
clusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States for certain torts of federal employees acting
within the scope of their employment.10 3 Appending the
petitioner's claims against the city and utility company to
the action against the federal government would require
the district court to extend its authority to additional par-
ties for whom an independent jurisdictional base was lack-
ing. Federal courts have pendent-claim jurisdiction
(jurisdiction over nonfederal claims between parties liti-
gating other matters properly before the court) when the
federal and nonfederal claims derive from a common nu-
cleus of operative facts and are such that a plaintiff would
ordinarily be expected to try them in one judicial pro-
ceeding. 0 4 With the addition of parties, however, as op-
posed to the addition of claims, it cannot be assumed thai
the forum's jurisdiction and power permitted by the Con.
stitution have been congressionally authorized. The Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act confers jurisdiction over civil action
on claims against the United States; it does not provide
for civil actions on claims that include requested relief againsi
the United States. 05 The Court found that "against th(
United States" means against the United States and n(
one else. 0 6 Regard for the rights of independent state
governments requires that federal courts confine thei:
own jurisdictions to the precise limits defined by the stat
ute.10 7 The Court concluded that the Federal Tort Claim
Act defines jurisdiction in a manner which does not lis
102 Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2005.
0o Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2005 (quoting United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 725.)
0 d. at 2008.
Id. at 2008-09.
,07 Id. at 2009 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 279 (1934)).
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defendants other than the United States. Although con-
solidated actions are efficient and convenient the Court
favored separate actions in federal courts and state courts
because the Federal Tort Claims Act permits the federal
government to be sued only in federal court, and parties
related to those claims cannot necessarily be sued there.
The Court held that the added claims involved added par-
ties over whom no independent basis of jurisdiction ex-
isted.10 8 While in a narrow class of cases a federal court
may assert authority over such a claim "ancillary" tojuris-
diction otherwise properly vested, the Court determined
that this was not such a case.' 09
The Court in Finley upheld the decision of Aldinger v.
Howard" ' and would not allow the United Mine Workers"'
approach to be extended to the pendent-party field. 1 2
Affirming the judgment of the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court did not allow the plaintiff to amend her
complaint to include claims against the original state
court defendants." 13 The Court noted that whatever it de-
cided regarding the "scope of jurisdiction conferred by a
particular statute" could be changed by Congress.' 14
4. Warsaw Convention
In Hamadeh v. Middle East Airlines,'" 5 a motion to dismiss
an airline's defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention was de-
nied.' 16 The court denied the plaintiff's motion because
it would have jurisdiction under the Convention only if
the passenger's "place of destination" was New York, as
the passenger argued, and not Beirut, as the airline ar-
'o" Id. at 2010.
',- See id. at 2004.
1,o 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
.. 383 U.S. at 715.
-"2 Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2010.
11.5 Id.
114 Id.




gued. There was a genuine issue of material fact with re-
spect to whether New York or Beirut was the passenger's
"place of destination"." 7
The Hamadeh court relied upon Gayda v. LOT Polish Air-
lines, ' 8 which noted that for Article 28 purposes, the ulti-
mate destination listed in the contract for carriage
determines the place of destination."' The court found
no dispute as to whether the plaintiff was traveling to New
York aboard the defendant's flight; the defendant argued,
however, that Beirut was the "ultimate destination" listed
in the contract for carriage as evidenced by the travel
agent's coupon.'2 0 Resolving all ambiguities and drawing
all reasonable inferences against the plaintiff, the court
held that the record contained insufficient evidence for
the court to conclude that the coupon issued by the in-
dependent travel agency did not represent the actual con-
tract for carriage under which the plaintiff traveled on the
day he was killed.' 21
C. Forum Non Conveniens
In Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,122 a federal district court
was held to have abused its discretion when it summarily
dismissed, on grounds of forum non conveniens, a products
liability suit seeking damages from the manufacture of the
aircraft in which the complainant was a passenger at the
time of the crash. Damages were also sought from the
manufacturers of the allegedly defective parts. 23  The
17 Id. at 18,511. Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides that "an
action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the
court of the domicile of carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has
a place of business through which the contract was made, or before the court at
the place of destination." Id.
"1 702 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1983).
19 Id. at 425.
120Hamadeh, 21 Av. Cas. at 18,511.
121 Id. Furthermore, the defendant had not had the opportunity to depose the
plaintiff's key witness. Id.
122 862 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1988).
123 Id. at 49. The lawsuit arose out of an air crash that occurred in British Co-
lumbia. The plaintiff was an Australian citizen working in British Columbia with
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plaintiff alleged that the air crash was "caused by engine
failure, which, in turn, was caused by defects in the design
and manufacture of the aircraft's exhaust system and
other defects."' 24 The suit was brought on theories of
negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. The
manufacturer of the aircraft, the manufacturer of the air-
craft's exhaust system, and the manufacturer of the air-
craft's engine filed separate motions to dismiss the
complaint on forum non conveniens grounds.1 25
In its motion to dismiss, the manufacturer of the aircraft
argued that there were liability issues as to parties who
were citizens of British Columbia, Canada, and not sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the court.126 The aircraft manu-
facturer claimed that the pilot had negligently loaded the
aircraft in excess of its permissible weight capacity, failed
to ensure that the exhaust system was properly inspected,
and failed to carry out appropriate emergency proce-
dures. It also argued that the accident was caused in
whole or in part by the aircraft's owner, its maintenance
contractor, and its owner. Since all of these parties would
be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of British Co-
lumbia, and the district court would be required to apply
the law of British Columbia and/or Australia, plaintiffs ar-
gued that their motion to dismiss based on forum non con-
veniens should be granted. 127
The engine manufacturer argued that the suit should
have been brought in British Columbia because that was
where the accident occurred, where the wreckage and en-
gine parts were presumed to be located, and where perti-
nent witnesses were believed to reside. 2  The
manufacturer also asserted that litigation arising out of
the Canadian Forest fire fighters. The British Columbia forest service arranged
for plaintiff to fly on a nonscheduled passenger flight. Id. at 40.
4 Id. at 40.
1 Id. These motions attempted to persuade the court that "the litigation could





the same accident was pending in British Columbia
against several Canadian parties, and that those parties
were indispensable to this litigation and not subject to the
jurisdiction of the court.12 9
The Third Circuit relied on Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, t3 0
and Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard,t 3t in which the Supreme
Court established the relevant jurisprudence of forum non
conveniens.13 2 The district court must first decide whether
an adequate alternative forum exists to hear the case. 33
Furthermore, the court should also consider an American
citizen's choice of his home forum over a foreigner's
choice of an American forum. If there is an adequate al-
ternative forum, the district court must consider and bal-
ance private and public factors that are relevant to the
forum non conveniens determination. 3 4 Although there are
no rigid rules governing the court's determination, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should only be disturbed if the
balance of factors is strongly in favor of the defendant. 3 5
The Third Circuit held that the district court's decision
"should be an exercise in structured discretion founded
on a procedural framework guiding the district court's de-
cision-making process."'' 13  The district court's decision
deserves substantial deference when it has considered all
public and private interest factors and its balancing of
these factors is reasonable.13 7 The review by the court of
appeals was limited to the question whether the district
court abused its discretion-it was not a de novo review of
"29 Id. at 41.
454 U.S. 235 (1981).
486 U.S. 517 (1988).
112 Lacey, 862 F.2d at 42. The Supreme Court established that, in the exercise
of discretion, a district court may dismiss a case "when an alternate forum has
jurisdiction to hear the case, and when trial in the chosen forum would 'establish
... oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant ... out of all proportion to
plaintiff's convenience,' or when the chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of
considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems." Id.
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theforum non conveniens issue.' 38
The Third Circuit held that the district court abused its
discretion when it summarily dismissed the suit on
grounds offorum non conveniens. 139 Dismissal of the action
was held to be improper because the court failed to obtain
adequate information from the manufacturers to facilitate
the forum non conveniens issue. Furthermore the court
failed to hold the manufacturers to their burden of per-
suasion, failed to adequately consider the contentions
raised by the plaintiff, and failed to adequately consider
and balance the relevant public and private interest fac-
tors affecting the forum non conveniens issue. 4 " The court
further stated that the plaintiff's choice of forum should
be given some weight when a foreign plaintiff is forced to
choose between two inconvenient forums.14' The trial
court's order granting the motion to dismiss was reversed,
and the case was remanded to the district court for further
proceedings. 142
In Nieves v. American Airlines,' 43 the court held the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens could not be properly applied
as a basis for dismissing an action brought by an airline
passenger who was a resident of New York and was alleg-
edly injured when her shoe stuck in an escalator step at an
airport in Puerto Rico. Plaintiff brought actions in both
New York and Puerto Rico against American Airlines for
the same injuries. 44
The court noted that "pendency of an action in the
state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same
matter in the federal court having jurisdiction .... A
suit may be brought in both a state and federal court. The
fact that the plaintiff brought an action in both New York
148 Id.




143 700 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
14- Id. at 770.
,, Id. at 771.
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and Puerto Rico, in and of itself, was not grounds for dis-
missal. The court found that the doctrine offorum non con-
veniens was not applicable and denied the airline's motion
to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. The court held
that the suit also could not be dismissed because the air-
line offered no authority for the appropriateness of dis-
missal on forum non conveniens grounds.'4 6
D. Venue
In Eason v. Linden Avionics, Inc. ,"4 the court found that
the District of New Jersey was the proper venue for the
claim against defendant Beech Aircraft. 4 ' This wrongful
death action was brought against the manufacturer of an
aircraft that took off from New Jersey and crashed in
Rhode Island. Defendant Beech Aircraft moved to dis-
miss the claim against it for lack of personal jurisdiction
and improper venue. The court noted that venue restric-
tions imposed upon a plaintiff are statutory in origin.1 49
Congress has limited a plaintiff's choice of venue in order
to protect defendants from the inconvenience and ex-
pense of defending actions in distant forums. 50 Venue
requirements were created "primarily [as] a matter of
convenience of litigants and witnesses." ' 5 1
Subject matter jurisdiction in Eason was based upon di-
versity of citizenship.15 2 Venue in a diversity action is gov.
erned by 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which states: "a civil actior
wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citi.
zenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, bc
brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs ol
all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose."'15 Th(
court found venue to be proper in the District of Ne-o
146 Id.
147 706 F. Supp. 311 (D.N.J. 1989).
148 Id. at 330.
.... Id. at 324.
1- Id.
151 Id.
i12 Id. at 325.
1.3 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988).
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Jersey because all defendants resided in New Jersey and
the cause of action arose in New Jersey. 54
Nieves v. American Airlines,1 55 involved an action brought
by an airline passenger who was a resident of New York
and was allegedly injured at an airport in Puerto Rico.
The court transferred the action to Puerto Rico because
"the center of gravity of the transaction in issue" was Pu-
erto Rico, and the airline had made the requisite showing
that a transfer was warranted. 156 The court found that
[t]he factors relevant to a determination of whether a
transfer is warranted include the convenience to parties;
the convenience of witnesses; the relative ease of access to
sources of proof; the availability of process to compel at-
tendance of witnesses; the cost of obtaining willing wit-
nesses; the practical problems that make trial of a case
easy, expeditious, and inexpensive; and the interest of
justice. . ..'5'
Although the plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to
some weight, it is given reduced emphasis where, as here,
the operative facts upon which the litigation is brought
bear little material connection to the chosen forum.... In
this action the underlying events all occurred in Puerto
Rico. [Defendant] American Airlines had a leasehold at
the International Airport and allegedly there was an in-
demnification agreement between American Airlines and
the Port Authority of Puerto Rico. The issue at trial was
found to be the precise situs of the accident and who had
control over that area. Additionally, all of the identified
witnesses that would be testifying about the accident re-
sided in Puerto Rico.
The court found the transfer of the case to Puerto Rico
appropriate because the "expense of producing even
some of these witnesses in New York would greatly ex-
ceed the outlays necessary to litigate in the District of Pu-
,.14 Eason, 706 F. Supp. at 325.
700 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
' Id at 772.
,.S Id.
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erto Rico."' 5  The court considered the fact that the
airline's non-party witnesses were not subject to compul-
sory process in New York and all of those witnesses were
amenable to compulsory process in Puerto Rico. The
court further looked at those parties already involved in
litigation in Puerto Rico, the convenience of the wit-
nesses, and the lower cost for the parties to litigate the
matter in Puerto Rico. The court found that since the
plaintiff initiated her action in New York and subsequently
filed a suit in Puerto Rico, allowing the lawsuit to remain
in New York would be both wasteful and unnecessarily
duplicative.' 5 9
E. Choice of Law
In Thornton v. Cessna Aircraft Co. ,160 the plaintiff brought
a wrongful death action in a South Carolina state court
against the manufacturer of an airplane for the death of
her husband in a crash in Tennessee. She asserted three
theories of recovery: negligence, strict liability, and
breach of warranty.' 6' The defendant later removed the
action to the U.S. District Court for the District of South
Carolina, and shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a sur-
vival action, asserting the same three theories of recovery.
The two actions were consolidated. The defendant then
moved forjudgment on the pleadings, asserting plaintiff's
claims were barred under the applicable Tennessee stat-
ute of repose.86 2
The court first considered the defendant's motion as it
related to the plaintiff's negligence and strict liability
claim. Where federal jurisdiction is based upon diversity,
the court is governed by the conflict of law rules of the
state in which it sits. South Carolina adheres to the tradi-
tional rule that, when an action is brought in onejurisdic-
i' ld. at 773.
lIo Id. at 774.
703 F. Supp. 1228 (D.S.C. 1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1989).
' ld. at 1229.
162 Id. (referring to TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980)).
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tion for a tort causing injury in another, the substantive
rights of the parties are governed by the lex loci delicti (the
law of the state in which the injury occurred) while mat-
ters of procedure are governed by the lexfori. Since the
crash occurred in Tennessee, the court applied the sub-
stantive law of Tennessee and the procedural law of South
Carolina. If the Tennessee statute of repose is a substan-
tive rule of law, it would control plaintiff's tort causes of
action and defeat those claims as a matter of law. A stat-
ute of limitation is generally procedural because it affects
the remedy rather than the right. Tennessee's statute of
repose requires that an action be brought within a fixed
period from some date unrelated to the accrual of the ac-
tion, such as the date of purchase or sale. This makes it a
substantive statute, affecting the plaintiff's right.'63
The plaintiff asserted that even if the Tennessee statute
of repose was controlling under the lex loci delicti rule, the
court should decline to apply it because of an earlier state
court ruling saying the statute of repose was procedural
rather than substantive, that the application of Tennessee
law would violate the plaintiff's due process rights under
the United States Constitution, and that the statute was
contrary to the public policy of South Carolina. The court
reasoned that, while an interlocutory state court ruling
prior to removal is subject to reconsideration by federal
court, it is neither final nor conclusive. 164
The district court disagreed with the state judge's con-
clusion and found the weight of authority is that such a
statute requiring that an action be brought within a fixed
period following the purchase of goods is substantive
rather than procedural because it affects the right rather
than the remedy. 65 Furthermore, the court held the ap-
plication of Tennessee law did not violate the plaintiff's
right to due process under the U.S. Constitution on the
I6' /d.
' Id. (citing General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore and Mich. So. Ry., 260 U.S.
261 (1922)).
--, Id. at 1231.
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grounds that there were insufficient contacts between the
state of Tennessee and the decedent. The Supreme
Court has expressly held that a state court may constitu-
tionally apply the law of the place of injury in a wrongful
death action arising from an airplane crash.' 66 The court
held that the Tennessee statute of repose applied to the
plaintiff's tort claims, and those claims were, therefore,
time barred.' 67 The court granted the defendant's motion
as it related to the plaintiff's negligence and strict liability
claims. 6 8
Next, the court considered the defendant's motion con-
cerningjudgment on the plaintiff's warranty causes of ac-
tion. It concluded that the motion should be denied
because those causes of action were governed by South
Carolina law. 169 Because the plaintiff asserted his war-
ranty claims under the Uniform Commercial Code, "the
forum state shall apply its law if it has a reasonable rela-
tionship to the contract."' 170 The decedent resided in
South Carolina and purchased and maintained the air-
plane in that state. Thus, there existed a "reasonable"
and "appropriate" relationship to South Carolina. The
court, in applying South Carolina law, denied defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleading insofar as it related
to plaintiff's cause of action for breach of warranty.' 71
In Myers v. Hayes International Corp. ,72 Tennessee's lex
loci delictus rule required the U.S. District Court to apply
Kentucky law to a products liability action against the
manufacturer of a military aircraft. Two injured crewmen
and the widows of three persons killed in a plane crash in
Kentucky sought recovery under theories of negligence,
breach of warranty, strict liability in tort, and violation of
I d. (citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962)).
,1,7 Id. at 1234.
168 Id.
16, Id. at 1235.
170 Id. at 1234 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-105(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
171 Id. at 1235.
172 701 F. Supp. 618 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
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the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. 73
Lockheed Corporation, the defendant, was the original
manufacturer of the aircraft. It moved for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that the action was barred by the
Tennessee statute of repose for products liability actions.
Plaintiff argued that the statute of repose was substantive
and, therefore, did not apply where the action was con-
trolled by Kentucky substantive law. 174
The court was obligated to apply the law of the forum
state, including the forum's choice of law rules. The court
recognized Tennessee's steadfast adherence to the tradi-
tional rule of lex loci delictus in determining which state's
substantive law applied to actions sounding in tort. The
court found that, where the tortious act and the resulting
injury occurred in different states, the traditional rule in
Tennessee is that the substantive law of the state where
the injury occurred controls. 75
The defendants argued that this case presented occa-
sion for diverging from the longstanding rule of lex loci.
They claimed the language of Winters v. Maxey, 1 76 and
Great American Insurance Company v. Hartford Accidental & In-
demnity Corp.,' 77 left open the possibility of adopting the
"dominant contacts" rule in the light of future legal de-
velopments. 78 The court was not persuaded by the de-
fendants' argument because they failed to demonstrate
the development of principles to warrant adoption of the
dominant contacts rule. Even if the court was convinced
the dominant contacts analysis was superior, the court
stated that it was not the proper mechanism to initiate the
divergence from a clearly established conflict of laws
17., Id. at 619; see TENN. CODE. ANN. § 29-28-103.
174 Myers, 701 F. Supp. at 620.
175 Id.
176 481 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1972).
177 519 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. 1975).
178 Myers, 701 F. Supp. at 620-22. The court found that the state supreme court
may repudiate lex loci when the dominant contacts analysis produces clear princi-
ples of decision that would result in two courts, under the same set of facts, reach-
ing the same conclusions. Id.
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rule. 79
The district court recognized the U.S. Supreme Court's
ruling in Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner,'80 that the
conflict of law rules to be applied by the federal courts
must conform to those prevailing in the forum state
courts. That case recognized that a federal court is not
free to engraft onto state rules exceptions or modifica-
tions which may commend themselves to the federal
court, but not to the state courts in which the federal
court sits. Therefore, the court's proper inquiry is
whether the circumstances of a case are so unique that the
applicability of the traditional rule is questionable, or
whether sufficiently uniform rules of decisions have
emerged to satisfy departure from the lex loci delictus.'8 '
The court's inquiry led it to conclude that, in the present
case, lex loci delictus was the applicable rule under Tennes-
see law. The accident, injuries, and death occurred in
Kentucky. Therefore, the substantive law of Kentucky
controlled the claim. 182
The court further determined that the Tennessee stat-
ute of repose is part of Tennessee substantive law. Since
Tennessee's statute of repose is substantive, lex loci com-
pelled the court to apply Kentucky substantive law. 183
The court further found that the differences between
Kentucky and Tennessee law did not warrant applying the
public policy exception to lex loci. The public policy ex-
ception could be applied only where the law of the juris-
diction where the tort occurred was contrary to good
morals or natural justice, or where its enforcement would
be prejudicial to the general interest of its citizens.
Therefore, in applying lex loci delictus, Kentucky substan-
tive law controlled and precluded Tennessee's statute of
repose from barring the plaintiff's action. 84
179 Myers, 701 F. Supp. at 622.
,8( 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
is, Myers, 701 F. Supp. at 622.
I.'2 Id.
I' Id.
,"4 Id. at 625.
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In In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton International Airport,
Denver, Colo., on Nov. 15, 1987,185 Texas law governed the
punitive damages claims arising out of an air crash in
which over eighty persons were either killed or injured.
During a snowstorm at Stapleton International Airport, a
Continental DC-9 crashed as it attempted to take off from
Denver, Colorado en route to Boise, Idaho. Actions were
brought against Continental Airlines for both personal in-
jury and wrongful death.' 86
The plaintiffs were residents of various states including
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Jersey, and Washington.
They claimed the crash was the result of pilot inexperi-
ence, ineffectual pilot training, and the willful, wanton,
and reckless disregard for passenger safety exhibited by
Continental Airlines. Plaintiffs contended that Continen-
tal engaged in a pattern and practice of falsifying pilot
records and other records in order to meet its demand for
pilots and pass FAA inspections.' 8 7
The defendants denied that negligence or wrongdoing
caused the crash. They asserted that third parties over
whom Continental had no control caused plaintiffs' dam-
age. Specifically, defendants designated the City and
County of Denver and the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion as culpable parties. The defendants contended that if
the acts of any Continental employee caused the crash,
those acts were limited to the decisions of the cockpit and
ground crews at Stapleton. 88
The parties presented choice of law motions on the is-
sue of punitive damages. The punitive damages laws of
Texas, Idaho, and Colorado were in irreconcilable con-
flict. 89 The district court began its analysis with a com-
parison of the punitive damages law of each jurisdiction to
'"- 720 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Colo. 1988).
1"m Id. at 1447.
197 Id
Ih8 Id.
181 Id. Idaho, (the residence of many of the victims), Colorado (the site of the




determine whether a conflict existed requiring application
of choice of law principles. The court found that the laws
of Idaho and Texas provided for punitive damages in
wrongful death actions, contract suits, and personal injury
cases. Colorado law provided punitive awards only in
personal injury cases while exemplary damages were pro-
hibited in actions for wrongful death or breach of con-
tract. The court found various other aspects of the states'
punitive damages laws to be in irreconcilable conflict.' 90
The district court applied the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict's two-step choice of law analysis. The first step
involves the identification of the states having contacts
with the parties in the crash. The second step comprises a
determination of the relative significance of these con-
tacts.' 9' The facts revealed Colorado and Texas provided
the most prominent locality of the conduct to be consid-
ered in the litigation. The court was persuaded that the
conduct for which Continental would be liable occurred
primarily in Texas, since the corporate conduct poten-
tially giving rise to an award of punitive damages occurred
in Texas.19 2 In air crash cases, the residence of the plain-
tiff is generally of little significance in analyzing the issue
of punitive damages. The interest of the domicile state is
served by the application of the state's law to see that the
plaintiffs are fully compensated for their injury and that
they do not become dependent on the state. The court
rejected an assertion that Idaho had the most significant
interest in the parties or occurrence, since the interests of
the complainants' domicile states were protected. The
court also did not apply Colorado's punitive damages laws
because they would have prejudicially frustrated the pro-
gress of the litigation. 9 3 Since Texas was both the site of
the conduct to which an award of punitive damages could
190 Id.
w, Id. at 1449; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 145 (1982).
192 Stapleton, 720 F. Supp. at 1451.
'- Id. at 1454. Colorado law would have exposed the airlines to injustice re-
sulting from consolidation procedures. Id.
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attach and the principal place of business of the defend-
ants, and since Texas had the most significant relationship
to the parties and occurrence with regard to the issue of
punitive damages, its relation to the litigation was most
important. Accordingly, the court applied the law of
Texas to the issue of punitive damages.1 94
The court disregarded the language of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts suggesting that the law of the state
of injury should apply unless some other state has a more
significant relationship to the litigation. In air crash cases,
the Restatement's suggestion can be easily overcome be-
cause courts view the site of injury as fortuitous.
In Baloise Insurance Co. v. United Airlines, Inc. ,'I the court
applied federal common law, and not New York law, to
determine the enforceability of provisions in air waybills
.that limited the liability of carriers for a lost shipment.
The plaintiffs, Baloise Insurance Company and Global
Lens Distribution Company, sued United Airlines
(United) and Skytruck International Air Freight (Sky-
truck), to recover for nondelivery and loss of a shipment
of optical products and equipment. 96 The case was
before the court on United's motion for summary judg-
ment, and Skytruck and the plaintiff's Rule 56 cross-mo-
tion for summary judgment. 97
Skytruck picked up optical equipment from the sup-
plier, consolidated the shipment to a single container, and
delivered the goods to United. United acknowledged it
had received the cargo at its warehouse at JFK Airport
and could not explain what happened to the cargo after its
arrival. Both United and Skytruck's waybills contained
limitation of liability clauses.19 8
The district court concluded that the limitation of liabil-
ity clauses in the air waybills of United and Skytruck were
194 Id.
".5 723 F. Supp. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
"sm Id. at 197.
,'7 Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
. Baloise, 723 F. Supp. at 198.
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enforceable. Federal common law governs a carrier's lia-
bility for the loss of goods during interstate shipment.
Absent some affirmative proof of conversion, courts ap-
plying federal common law will enforce a contractual limi-
tation of liability provision. 199
Under New York law, the court recognized that a plain-
tiff can establish a prima facie case of conversion by prov-
ing delivery to a bailee and the bailee's failure to return
the property upon demand. The defendant must then
provide "evidence sufficient to prove that its failure to re-
turn the property is not the result of its conversion of that
property to its own use. ' 20 0 Since federal common law
governs a carrier's liability for the loss of goods during
interstate shipment, and the plaintiffs did not offer any ev-
idence to suggest that either defendant converted the op-
tical equipment to its own use, the court held that the
liability limiting provisions of the defendants' airbills were
enforceable.
The court found no merit in the argument that New
York law should apply because the goods had previously
been stored in New York. New York rules of interstate
commerce apply only to bailees in the business of storing
goods and not to temporary bailments incident to inter-
state shipment.2 0 ' The court also found no genuine issue
of material fact and granted both defendants' motions. for
summary judgment. 0 2
In Damin Aviation Corp. v. Sikorsky Aircraft,0 3 Damin Avi-
ation Corporation (Damin) brought a diversity action for
its alleged loss of profits caused by the crash of a helicop-
ter it leased and operated. Sikorsky Aircraft (Sikorsky)
manufactured the helicopter's airframe. Sikorsky was a
Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business
in Connecticut. Allison, a Delaware corporation with its
199 Id.
2- Id. (citing I.C.C. Metals, Inc. v. Municipal Warehouse Co., 50 N.Y.2d 657,
409 N.E.2d 849, 851, 431 N.Y.S.2d 372, 374 (1980)).
201 Id. at 199.
202 Id.
2"3 705 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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principal place of business in Michigan, manufactured the
engine. Damin's principal place of business was in New
Jersey, and it was a New Jersey corporation. The crash
occurred in Fort Dix, New Jersey. The helicopter was a
complete loss, the copilot died, and the pilot was seriously
injured.20 4 Damin's claim for consequential damages was
based on four theories of liability: negligence, breach of
express warranties, breach of implied warranties, and
strict liability in tort. After completing discovery, the de-
fendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1)
Damin could not recover in tort for consequential eco-
nomic loss as a matter of law, and (2) Damin could not
recover on the contract for such loss because of various
warranty limitations.20 5
Because jurisdiction was based on diversity, the court
applied the choice of law rules of New York, the forum
state. New York courts apply the "substantial interest"
test to tort choice of law issues. In this test, controlling
effect is given to the law of the jurisdiction which, because
of its relationship to the occurrence or contact with the
parties, has the greatest concern with specific issues raised
in the litigation.20 6 Since the loci of the tort was in New
Jersey, as was the plaintiff's domicile, New Jersey had the
most "substantial interest" in the issue of whether the
plaintiff should have a remedy in tort. Under New Jersey
law, the plaintiff was barred from recovering in negligence
and strict liability for purely economic loss. The court
limited Damin to remedies under the U.C.C.20 7
When deciding contract issues, New York courts apply
the "paramount interest" test to determine the choice of
law. Under this test, the law of the jurisdiction having the
greatest interest in the litigation is applied. The court
modified the paramount interest test because the agree-
ment expressly provided Connecticut law would govern
2 4 Id. at 171-73.
20.5 Id.
20.1 Id. at 17.
207 Id.
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its construction. Connecticut was the principal place of
business of Sikorsky. Therefore, there were sufficient
contacts with the transaction to warrant honoring the par-
ties' contractual choice of Connecticut law.20 8
The plaintiff unsuccessfully alleged that the defendant
acted in bad faith by selling a product it knew to be defec-
tive. The court found that there had been full opportu-
nity for discovery in the case and the plaintiff had not
uncovered any evidence of prior knowledge by the de-
fendant of the engine defect responsible for the crash.20 9
The plaintiff's unsupported suspicion of bad faith did not
create a genuine factual dispute and could not estop the
defendant from invoking its contractual exclusion of con-
sequential damages.
The plaintiff also made an unsuccessful claim for puni-
tive damages. Since the defendants were entitled to sum-
mary judgment on all of the plaintiff's substantive claims,
the punitive damage claim could not stand alone.21 0
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Manufacturer's Duty to Warn
In John Deere Co. v. May, 2 the decedent was killed
when his bulldozer backed over him. The plaintiff's the-
ory of recovery was that the bulldozer backed over the de-
cedent when it shifted itself from neutral into reverse.
The evidence showed that John Deere Company (John
Deere) knew as early as 1971 that its bulldozers would
shift into gear from neutral if they were left with their en-
gines running. Over the years, John Deere continued to
receive reports of similar occurrences. Although the com-
pany notified dealers of this dangerous propensity in the
1970's, it did not warn owners of the danger until 1983.2
In 1983,John Deere attempted to notify owners by mail
208 Id.
2-s' Id. at 175.
2'1o Id. at 177-79.
21, 773 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, writ dism'd).
2 2 Id. at 371-72.
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of the danger and inform them of a modification program.
John Deere had no way of knowing whether the decedent
had actually received the notification, since there was no
evidence of a signed postal receipt. John Deere, however,
knew the decedent had not responded to its original letter
because his name continued to appear on monthly reports
listing owners whose bulldozers had not been modified.
The company made no further effort to contact him by
phone or mail between May 1983 and his death in August
1984. Evidence revealed John Deere relied on its field
representatives and dealers to notify owners regarding
the modification program.21 3
The court stated that the manufacturer could not rely
on an intermediary to warn those endangered by a prod-
uct's use, unless it had reasonable assurance the warning
would be communicated. Because the decedent had not
responded to the original warning letter and the monthly
reports, the court concluded that the jury reasonably
could have found John Deere did not have reasonable as-
surance that its field representatives and dealers had
warned the decedent of the danger. John Deere's failure
to warn the decedent of the danger that the bulldozer
might move while in neutral constituted conscious indif-
ference, and the manufacturer and the distributor could
have been found guilty of gross negligence.2 14
The court also admitted evidence of other incidents to
show the defects of the bulldozer to the extent that the
incidents and the accident involving the bulldozer oc-
curred under reasonably similar, but not necessarily iden-
tical, circumstances. The court found that the
circumstances surrounding the decedent's death and
thirty-four other extraneous incidents were reasonably
similar in that they all involved the same make of
bulldozer.215
213 Id. at 378.
24 Id. at 379.
5 Id. at 372-73.
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In Argubright v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,216 the court decided
when, under Texas law, a potential hazard in a product
may be deemed so open and obvious as to obviate the
duty of the manufacturer to warn prospective users. The
suit arose from the crash of a Beech Aircraft known as the
Musketeer Model B23. The pilot's seat unlocked during
takeoff. The plaintiffs contended that an unlocked seat
could go unnoticed until pushed by takeoff forces. De-
fendant Beech pointed to considerable evidence that the
seat would slide during more gentle takeoff maneuvers,
thereby alerting the pilot or causing the seat to lock auto-
matically. Defendant Beech argued that the pilot un-
locked his seat and attempted to reposition it during the
actual takeoff.21 7
The survivors of the crash filed a products liability ac-
tion against Beech Aircraft, alleging both strict liability
and negligence. The plaintiffs argued, first, that Beech
defectively designed the pilot's seat in such a manner as to
allow the seat to slide all the way back on its runner,
rather than to automatically relock if left unlocked by the
pilot prior to takeoff. The jury returned a verdict against
the defective design of the seat mechanism, and thus
ruled out the strict liability claim. The jury did, however,
agree with the plaintiff's second allegation that Beech
negligently failed either to warn the decedent of the risk
of leaving the seat unlocked, or to instruct in the preflight
check list that the seat be locked and left locked prior to
and during the takeoff. The district court denied a post-
trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
filed by Beech.21 8
On appeal, Beech argued that the district court errone-
ously denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. Beech argued that it should not have been
found negligent because the district court should have
found, as a matter of law, that it owed no duty to warn the
216 868 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1989).
2 7 Id. at 765.
2.. Id. at 766.
1990]
40 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
plaintiffs of the risks of failing to properly lock the pilot's
seat. Beech also argued that it satisfied any duty that may
have existed by supplying the plane's owner with a revised
manual containing warning information, pursuant to an
FAA directive.219
The court of appeals found that although the absence
of adequate warnings or directions could render a prod-
uct defective and unreasonably dangerous, even if the
product had no manufacturing or design defects, there
was no duty to warn where the defect was obvious and
within the knowledge and expertise of those who could
reasonably be expected to use the product. The court,
applying Texas law, held the danger of an unlocked pilot's
seat during takeoff was so open and obvious a hazard that
it obviated any duty of the manufacturer of the aircraft to
warn prospective users.22 ° Moreover, the manufacturer
should be allowed to rely on a pilot's knowledge that con-
stant positioning and smooth adjustment of the altitude
control would be difficult, if not impossible, especially
during the critical moments of a takeoff, if directed from a
seat that was able to move freely in the same direction as
the control. It was significant that the manufacturer had
included the seat lock in a preflight check list sent to the
owner of the aircraft. The practice of relying on the check
list undermined the contention that some additional
warning was necessary.2 2'
The court did not resolve the question of whether the
plaintiff unlocked his seat during takeoff. The court
found, as a matter of law, that Beech owed no duty to
warn the plaintiff of the need to lock the seat prior to
takeoff. The court of appeals also held the district court
judge erred by allowing the jury to find to the contrary
and by denying defendant Beech's motion for directed
verdict and judgment n.o.V.2 2 2
219 Id
22o Id. at 767.
'2 Id. at 766.




In Walton v. Avco Corp. ,223 a products liability suit was
brought against the manufacturer of a helicopter and the
manufacturer of a defective engine. The pilot and passen-
gers lost their lives when the engine in the helicopter
seized in mid-flight, causing the aircraft to crash. Subse-
quent investigation revealed that the accident occurred
due to the failure of an oil pump which was a component
of the engine manufactured by Avco. Complaints were
filed against both Avco and Hughes Helicopter, Inc., the
designer, manufacturer, and retailer of the helicopter. Af-
ter extensive pretrial procedures, the cases were consoli-
dated for trial and ultimately submitted to the jury on
strict products liability theories alone. The jury found
both Avco and Hughes strictly liable and awarded dam-
ages to the estates of both decedents. The court, on ap-
peal, found no dispute as to the jury finding that the
engine manufactured by Avco was a defective product
under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
It was also undisputed that when Avco became aware of
the defective construction of the engine, it issued service
instructions advising Hughes of the specific defect in the
Avco engine and a detailed procedure to remedy this de-
fect. Defendant Hughes received the service instructions
from Avco. Unfortunately, Hughes never forwarded the
service instruction or advised the owner of the helicopter
or its authorized helicopter service of its contents. Over
one year after Avco had issued the instruction, the engine
was overhauled, but the defect in the helicopter was not
remedied due to the fact that Hughes had not advised Ex-
ecutive Helicopters, an authorized Hughes Service
Center, of the service instructions.224
Following the verdict, Hughes sought a judgment n.o.v
on the strict liability issue of its failure to warn of the de.
fective design of the Avco helicopter engine. Hughes ar.
23 557 A.2d 372 (Pa. 1989).
224 Id. at 375-76.
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gued that the issue of failure to warn is addressed only
when a product is designed and manufactured without de-
fect. The court disagreed with Hughes' construction of
the strict products liability law and found that the trial
court correctly concluded that Hughes, as the manufac-
turer of the helicopter, could be held strictly liable for the
defective nature of the helicopter. Hughes had failed to
warn the plaintiff of the defect in the design of the heli-
copter's engine which was discovered and publicized after
the sale of the aircraft. 5
The court reviewed the evidence and had no difficulty
concluding that the jury could, without legal error, im-
pose strict liability upon Hughes. The fact that Avco was
also found to be strictly liable because it designed, manu-
factured, and sold a defectively designed helicopter en-
gine did not preclude a finding that Hughes was strictly
liable. Even though the manufacturer of the helicopter
had been notified of the defect in the design of the en-
gine, it had failed to issue warnings and service instruc-
tions to prior purchasers who were presumably still flying
the helicopters. In addition, the court felt the helicopter
manufacturer had failed to distribute to its authorized ser-
vice centers a service instruction issued by the manufac-
turer of the engine. The court noted the helicopter was a
unique and costly product which was manufactured, mar-
keted, and sold to a specialized group of consumers.226
The court further remarked that many issues regarding a
manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn were not implicated
in this case and, thus, were not addressed by its decision.
It left for future cases the task of formulating the bounda-
ries of the product manufacturer's post-sale legal obliga-
tion. The court was convinced, however, that boundaries
must be recognized. Strict products liability is justified
when it encourages manufacturers and sellers to provide
the public with safe products.2 27
225 Id. at 376.
226 Id. at 379.
227 Id. at 380.
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C. Warranties
In Woodworth v. Gates Learjet Corp.,228 the plaintiff
brought an action alleging a breach of an implied war-
ranty of fitness for failure to install a bird-resistant wind-
shield in an aircraft involved in a fatal accident caused by
a collision with a bird. The Michigan court of appeals
found that the trial court erred in granting a directed ver-
dict in favor of the owner of the aircraft. The case arose
out of an airplane accident in which a Model 23 Learjet
collided with a common loon weighing between three and
eleven pounds. Plaintiff's decedent, the copilot, was
killed when the bird came through the windshield of the
airplane. The airplane was manufactured by Gates
Learjet Corporation, purchased by Freedom Interna-
tional, maintained by Jet Care Center and leased to the
employer of the plaintiff's decedent.22 9
The plaintiff alleged that Freedom International and Jet
Care Center were negligent in failing to install a bird-re-
sistant windshield on the airplane. Additionally, the
plaintiff alleged that Freedom International breached its
implied warranty of fitness. The Federal Aviation Admin-
istration certified the aircraft as airworthy in 1964 under
regulations not requiring a bird-resistent windshield. In
1966, the FAA approved Learjet's Model 24, which did
require a bird-resistant windshield. That same year
Learjet made available a kit to convert the Model 23 air-
craft to a Model 24 aircraft.23 0 Plaintiff introduced no evi-
dence that the windshield on the airplane was defectivel)
manufactured or that its failure was caused by impropel
maintenance. Instead, all the evidence indicated that the
windshield, as designed, simply could not withstand thc
impact of the bird.23 '
The Michigan court of appeals held that a Michigar
statute which states that the owner or operator responsi
228 173 Mich. App. 480, 434 N.W.2d 167 (1988).
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ble for the maintenance or use of an aircraft would be lia-
ble for any injury occasioned by the negligent operation
of the aircraft was not applicable to the case.232 The court
found that the purpose of the statute was to impose liabil-
ity on owners of aircraft who entrusted their planes to
negligent pilots, rather than on owners who failed to in-
stall aircraft components not required under FAA
Regulations.23
The appeals court further held that the trial court erro-
neously ruled that the plaintiff's decedent, as an em-
ployee of the lessee of the aircraft, could not recover from
the lessor for breach of an implied warranty. The court's
reading of pertinent cases indicated that even if the plain-
tiff's decedent was an employee of the corporation which
leased the airplane, the plaintiff could still make a claim
against the owner, as lessor, for breach of an implied war-
ranty of fitness. The court further found that if the plain-
tiff proved the existence of an implied warranty and its
breach, lack of privity would not bar recovery for breach
of implied warranty.23 4
The case of Mergen v. Piper Aircraft Corp. 235 arose from
the crash of a twin-engine Piper airplane and the deaths of
the pilot and his two passengers. The decedents took off
in a twin-engine Piper aircraft with visibility reduced to
zero because of fog. They were without radio contact or
radar guidance from the closed airport tower. Three min-
utes after takeoff the plane went down in a subdivision,
killing all aboard. It was determined that the right engine
had been shut off prior to impact, as evidenced by the
feathering of the propellers, and that the left engine was
operating at between 80% to 100% of its power. The
right engine's oil dip stick was bent and out of its socket,
and the crankcase was crushed. Although the aircraft was
designed to fly on one engine, the pilot had to maintain
212 Id. at 480, 434 N.W.2d at 170.
I2 d. at 480, 434 N.W.2d at 171.
234 Id. at 480, 434 N.W.2d at 170-71.
2 524 So. 2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
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the left engine at full throttle in order to maintain altitude
and climbing speed after the right engine was shut down.
The plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the
manufacturer of the aircraft, the manufacturer of the air-
craft engine, and the seller of the aircraft. Plaintiff alleged
that, but for the left engine's failure, the pilot could have
safely feathered the right engine and landed the plane.
Defendants argued that the pilot feathered the right en-
gine for no reason and lost control of the aircraft when
the plane rolled to the right due to the left engine
torque.23 6
The plaintiffs contended that the aircraft had two seri-
ous problems when it left the manufacturer. They sub-
mitted evidence of extensive repair records and the
testimony of expert witnesses indicating that the defend-
ants breached their duty to deliver their plane free of de-
fects. Since the defects in the aircraft were the same
defects which caused the plane to crash, the court held the
defendants liable. The court further held that the aircraft
suffered from defects sufficient to annul the sale. The
court found that the defects in the aircraft, which caused
detonation, premature aging, and heat damage in both
engines rendered its use so inconvenient that the pur-
chaser would not have purchased it had the defects been
known. The court rescinded the sale of the airplane and
ordered its purchase price returned, in addition to pay-
ment of reasonable attorney's fees and interest from the
day of the judicial demand until payment was made.237
D. Evidence
In Fasanaro v. Mooney Aircraft Corp. ,238 defendant
Mooney Aircraft Corporation (Mooney) filed a motion in
limine for the exclusion of evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures. Plaintiff's husband was killed while pilot-
ing an M20K aircraft designed and manufactured by
2.16 Id. at 1350-51.
"3 Id. at 1354-55.
21m 687 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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Mooney. After the accident, Mooney took a number of
remedial measures, including (1) changing the location of
the alternate air door; (2) changing the air door from
manual activation to automatic activation; (3) changing
the Pilot's Operating Handbook regarding induction, ic-
ing, and engine restart procedures; (4) making recom-
mendations to pilots regarding the maintenance and
operation of the M20K; (5) pressuring the Magnetos; and
(6) undertaking testing of the alternate air door, engine
induction, and engine restart on the M20K.239
Mooney moved for exclusion of this evidence under
Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.24 ° Plaintiff
raised several arguments in opposition to the motion
under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.2 4 ' The
plaintiff argued that the court should apply the California
Evidence Code's equivalent of Rule 407, which would al-
low admission of this evidence.242 Second, plaintiff ar-
gued that the evidence was admissible on the issue of
contributory negligence and for impeachment purposes.
Finally, plaintiff argued that the post-accident tests were
not within the scope of Rule 407.43
The court started its analysis with a discussion of Erie.
The Supreme Court held, in Erie, that federal courts are
constitutionally obligated to apply the substantive rules of
decisions prescribed by state law.244 Examining subse-
quent cases articulating the distinction between "rules of
substance" and "procedure," the district court held that
Rule 407 could rationally be classified as procedural.
Rule 407 was directly applicable since the plaintiff sought
to introduce evidence of subsequent remedial measures.
2"' Id. at 483.
24,, FED. R. EVID. 407. Rule 407 provides, in part, "[w]hen, after an event, meas-
ures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to
occur, evidence of the subsequent measure is not admissible to prove negligence
or culpable conduct in connection with the event." Id.
24, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
242 CAL. EvID. CODE § 1151 (West 1966).
24-1 Fasanaro, 687 F. Supp. at 48a.
24 Erie, 304 U.S. at 65.
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The rule prohibits such evidence. The court concluded
that the federal rule was controlling, and that Congress
had the power to enact the rule through the Rules En-
abling Act. 45
The court found no merit in the plaintiff's contention
that Rule 407 does not require the exclusion of evidence
of subsequent measures when offered to refute the manu-
facturer's defense of contributory negligence, or for im-
peachment purposes. The court held, however, that the
evidence of testing undertaken by the defendant after the
date of the decedent's accident was not within the scope
of Rule 407. Rule 407 includes only the actual remedial
measures themselves and not the initial steps toward as-
certaining whether there is a call for any remedial meas-
ures. Any tests conducted by the manufacturer were
found to fall outside the scope of Rule 407, and evidence
of such tests was, therefore, admissible. The cour
granted defendant's motion to exclude evidence of the
subsequent remedial measures and denied the motion tc
exclude any post-event tests.246
In Causey v. Zinke, 47 the Ninth Circuit found no revers
ible error in the admission of a Federal Aviation Adminis
tration report concerning Pan American World Airways
(Pan Am) safety record and procedures, or in the admis
sion of a report by Pan Am on its own safety record an(
problems completed just before the crash. The appeal
court found the FAA report on Pan Am's safety recor
and procedures admissible pursuant to Federal Rule c
Evidence 803(8)(C) which creates a hearsay exception fo
public documents. Further, defendant Pan Am failed t,
demonstrate that the report was untrustworthy or undul
prejudicial. 48
Defendant argued that the district court erred in admii
ting the report pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidenc
245 Fasanaro, 687 F. Supp. at 486; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
24.. Id. at 487.
247 871 F.2d 812 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 277 (1989).
248 Id. at 816.
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801(d)(2)(D). This rule provides that statements which
are not hearsay include admissions of a party opponent
and defines such admissions as "a statement by the party's
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of
his agency or employment, made during the existence of
the relationship. ' 249 Since all but one of the authors of
the report were experienced Pan Am crew members, the
court held that the report was admissible as an admission
of Pan Am's employees concerning matters within the
scope of their employment. 250
Pan Am further argued that the FAA report, in effect,
was a subsequent remedial measure and was thus inadmis-
sible under Federal Rule of Evidence 407.25' The court
expressed the purpose of Rule 407 as being to ensure that
prospective defendants will not forego safety improve-
ments because they fear that these improvements will be
used against them as evidence of their liability. Neither of
the reports were found to be subsequent remedial meas-
ures and, therefore, inadmissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 407. The appeals court looked to the defend-
ant's participation in the subsequent measures at issue
and found the admission of those measures into evidence
would not "penalize" the defendant for efforts to remedy
the safety problem. In this case, Pan Am's management
had a legal obligation to cooperate with the FAA's investi-
gation. Thus, the admission of the FAA report did not
penalize Pan Am for its voluntary participation in safety
measures and was not a subsequent remedial measure in
response to the crash. 52
E. Statute of Repose
In Myers v. Hayes International Corporation,253 the Tennes-
see ten-year statute of repose did not operate to bar a
241. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D).
250 Causey, 871 F.2d at 816.
25 FED. R. EVID. 407; for the language of the rule, see supra note 240.
252 871 F.2d at 816-17.
2.- 701 F. Supp. 618 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
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products liability action arising out of a plane crash. The
flight was to begin and end in Tennessee but crashed on
the Kentucky side of the Ft. Campbell military installation.
Each member of the five-man crew of the military aircraft
was a resident of Tennessee. Plaintiffs sought recovery
under theories of negligence, breach of warranty, strict li-
ability, and violation of consumer protection legislation.
Defendant Lockheed Corporation, the original manufac-
turer of the aircraft, moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the action was barred by the Tennessee stat-
ute of repose for products liability actions. The plaintiffs
responded by arguing that the statute of repose is sub-
stantive and does not apply where the action is controlled
by other substantive law. 54 The United States District
Court held that the substantive law of Kentucky applied
because the accident, injuries, and deaths occurred in
Kentucky.255
On the question of whether the Tennessee statute of
repose applied to this action, the district court found that
the Tennessee statute of repose is part of Tennessee sub-
stantive law. Since lex loci compelled the court to apply
Kentucky substantive law, plaintiffs' cause of action was
not barred by the ten-year statute of repose.256
III. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
A. Applicability and Immunity
In Solis v. Iberia Airlines,257 an action against the defend-
ant, Iberia Airlines, could not be remanded to the state
court from which it was removed since the airline wa,
owned, operated, and funded by an agency of the govern
ment of Spain and was a "foreign state" under sectior
1603 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 197(
24 Id. at 620.
25- See id. at 622-25.
2- Id. at 625. For additonal discussion of the choice of laws issue in this case
see supra notes 172-179 and accompanying text,
257 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,764 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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(FSIA). 218 The federal court had original jurisdiction pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. 1330 because the action was against a
foreign state. 259 Furthermore, Iberia waived the defense
of sovereign immunity by accepting a Civil Aeronautics
Board permit to conduct flights in the United States. This
waiver, however, was found to be irrelevant and had no
bearing upon its right of removal. The court noted that
forum selection by a foreign state, as contemplated by
statute, is not defeated by lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion or statutory prohibition. 60
Plaintiff further argued that the removal petition was
defective because an additional defendant did not join in
the removal. The court found that where a foreign state
removes an action to federal court, the entire action is re-
moved, regardless of whether codefendants join in the re-
moval petition. Therefore, the court denied the motion
to remand the action to the state court.2 6 '
In Matton v. British Airways Board, Inc. ,262 an airline was
found not to be a foreign state within the meaning of the
FSIA. The claim arose from an injury resulting from the
defendant's negligence while the plaintiff was making a
truck delivery onto a loading platform at JFK Interna-
tional Airport. At the time the plaintiff sustained his inju-
ries, the British government owned the defendant
corporation, known as British Airways Board, Inc. Ap-
proximately five months after the accident, British Air-
ways PLC succeeded to the business of British Airways
Board, Inc. Approximately three years later, the British
government divested itself of its majority stock ownership
of the defendant. Defendant became a private corpora-
tion no longer operated or owned by the government.263
Plaintiffs, who sought damages for personal injuries
and loss of services, commenced their action in the
,1- 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1988).
2m, 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,765.
21R0 Id.
261 Id.
262 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,046 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
2 G.1 Id. at 18,047.
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Supreme Court of New York. Defendant removed the suit
to the United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(c) on the grounds that the defendant was a foreign
state within the meaning of section 1603 of the FSIA.2
Sections 1441(d) and 1330(a) of the FSIA provide for a
nonjury trial when a foreign state is a defendant in the
litigation. The action was before the district court on de-
fendant's motion to strike plaintiffs' demand for a jury
trial. Plaintiffs cross-moved to remand to state court pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)(d) or, in the alternative, to
direct a jury trial and permit plaintiffs to amend their
complaint to include a jurisdictional allegation of diversity
of citizenship. In addition, plaintiffs sought to amend
their complaint to correctly identify defendant, British
Airways Board, Inc., as British Airways PLC.265
The FSIA describes the manner in which an action can
be maintained against a foreign state or its entities in the
United States. Section 1603(a) of the FSIA defines a for-
eign state as including "an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state as defined in subsection (b)."2 66 Section
1330 of the FSIA gives federal district courts original ju-
risdiction in "any nonjury civil action against a foreign
state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any
claim for relief in personam with respect to which the for-
eign state is not entitled to immunity.9 267
The district court found that once a foreign state sells
its interest in a defendant agency or instrumentality con-
gressional concern with the sensitivity of actions involving
2- Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
21 Matton, 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,047.
2- 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). Subsection (b) provides that:
(b) an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state means any entity -
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2)
which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned
by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is
neither a citizen of a state of the United States ... and are created
under the laws of any third country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
267 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
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foreign states is no longer implicated. The rationale be-
hind the FSIA in favoring nonjury trials was uniformity in
decision making, foreign states' lack of familiarity with
jury trials, and a fear of overly generous damage awards
where a "deep pocket" is involved. The reasons cited by
the court had no application once the defendant in the
action no longer met the statutory definition of an agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state. The court found no
basis for stretching the dictates of the FSIA beyond their
intended purpose. Therefore, the provisions of the FSIA
requiring a nonjury trial when a foreign state is a defend-
ant did not apply.26 8
In addition to resisting the defendant's motion to strike
their jury demand, the plaintiffs contended that the priva-
tization of the defendant destroyed the basis for removal
and that the action should, therefore, be remanded to
state court. The court pointed out that section 1332(a)(2)
of the FSIA vested the court with diversity jurisdiction
since the action was between "citizens of a State and citi-
zens or subjects of a foreign state. '2 69 To remand the
case to state court at the present stage of litigation would
have resulted in a gross waste of both state and federal
judicial resources. The court denied plaintiffs' motion to
remand the action to state court. Plaintiffs, however, were
allowed to amend their complaint to properly name Brit-
ish Airways PLC as the defendant in the action.27 °
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In In re Compania Mexicana de Aviacion,27 1 the Ninth Cir-
cuit found the federal trial court lacked jurisdiction over
an action arising out of a fatal air crash in Mexico,
brought on behalf of sixty-nine Mexican decedents who
traveled on tickets purchased in Mexico for travel within
Mexico.
2- Matton, 21 Av. Cas. at 18,048.
26s, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1988).
270 Id. at 18,049.
271 859 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1988).
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The plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the
entire action without prejudice. Because Mexicana had
answered the complaint, the clerk accepted, but did not
file, the dismissal. Mexicana then moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction andforum
non conveniens. At the same time, codefendant Boeing
moved to correct the docket to reflect that the voluntary
dismissal was effective as to all defendants except Mexi-
cana. The district court granted Boeing's motion to cor-
rect the docket, dismissing the action against all
defendants except Mexicana, and denied Mexicana's mo-
tion to dismiss. Mexicana moved for reconsideration of
its motion to dismiss, but the court denied the motion.
Mexicana then filed its petition for a writ of mandamus.
The court of appeals found that the denial of the motion
to dismiss for sovereign immunity was an appealable col-
lateral order, and that mandamus was not available in the
case. The court construed the petition as a notice of ap-
peal because of the harsh result which would be obtained
if the mandamus petition was simply denied. 2
The court of appeals agreed with the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain,27 where an
order denying immunity under the FSIA was held appeal-
able under the collateral order doctrine. The court held
that an interlocutory appeal ensures that "a foreign state
shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States and of the states except as provided in
the FSIA."' 274 Therefore, the denial of Mexicana's motion
to dismiss was an immediately appealable order.
The FSIA is the exclusive source of subject matter juris-
diction over suits involving foreign states or their instru-
mentalities. A court lacks both statutory subject matter
and personal jurisdiction over any claim against a foreign
sovereign unless one of the Act's exceptions applies.
272 Id. at 1357 (citing Clorox Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 779 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.
1985)).
27. 816 F.2d 344 (7th Cir, 1987).
•74Mexicana, 859 F.2d at 1358 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1604).
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Mexicana Airlines, being wholly owned by the Mexican
government, was found to be a foreign state. Therefore,
Mexicana was immune from suit in these cases unless it
had waived immunity, the action was based on a commer-
cial activity, or the action was based on a treaty conferring
jurisdiction.2 75
The plaintiffs argued that Mexicana waived its sover-
eign immunity by relying on a U.S. Department of Trans-
portation Foreign Aircraft Permit issued to it, which
included a waiver of any defense of sovereign immunity
from any suit arising out of operations under the permit.
The court stated that the plaintiffs were asking too much
from this waiver, and a recent change of the waiver lan-
guage made it clear that the intent behind the waiver was
to give the United States courts jurisdiction over cases
that have substantial contact with the United States. The
decedents all purchased tickets in Mexico. for travel be-
tween points of origin and destination within Mexico.
The tickets, which were the governing contracts of car-
riage, demonstrated no contacts with the United States.276
The same result was obtained under the Warsaw Con-
vention, because the tickets concerned were not for inter-
national air transportation but for domestic Mexican
flights. The Warsaw Convention establishes exclusive ju-
risdiction before the court of domicile of the carrier, its
principal place of business, the place of business where
the contract was made, or the place of destination. The
place of destination is the final destination according to
the contract of carriage. The court concluded that the
fact the airplane was ultimately scheduled to arrive in Los
Angeles did not provide a basis for jurisdiction.27 7
Relying on section 1605 of the FSIA, the court stated
that a foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States for its commercial activi-
ties in the United States or its activities outside the United
27,5 Id. at 1359.
276 Id.
277 Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988).
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States which cause a direct effect in the United States.
Commercial activity carried on in the United States by a
foreign state is defined as commercial activity having sub-
stantial contact with the United States. While Mexicana
conducted commercial activities within the United States,
that fact alone did not subject it to the action. FSIA re-
quires a significant "nexus" between the cause of action
and the "commercial activity" carried on in the United
States. The only nexus plaintiffs alleged between the
cause of action and the commercial activity conducted in
the United States was the fact that the airplane had been
serviced in Chicago prior to the accident and its ultimate
destination was Los Angeles. The appeals court ruled
that there was no jurisdiction based upon an act in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity
elsewhere, and that Mexicana had not performed any acts
in the United States having any significant nexus with this
action.278
An additional exception to the FSIA involves commer-
cial activity outside the United States which causes a direct
effect within this country. The court held the FAA's or-
ders relating to heavy jet aircraft in the United States
fleet, issued as a result of the Mexicana crash, did not con-
stitute a direct effect within the United States. Therefore,
the court found the direct effect exception inapplicable.
The direct effect of a negligent act abroad is limited to the
death or injury resulting from the negligent act. It does
not extend to other, indirect consequences.
In In re Air Crash Disaster near Warsaw, Poland on May 9,
1987,280 a federal trial court lacked subject matter juris-
diction under the FSIA over the Soviet manufacturer of an
aircraft that was sold to a Polish airline and involved in a
crash. The plaintiff brought an action against LOT Polish
Airlines (LOT) and the Soviet Union alleging that two of
27MMexicana, 859 F.2d at 1360.
I279 d.; see Australian Gov't Aircraft Factories v. Lynne, 743 F.2d 672 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985).
28o 716 F. Supp. 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)[hereinafter, Warsaw Air Crash].
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the aircraft's engines failed, causing a fire that led to the
crash. Plaintiff also alleged that LOT was negligent and
committed willful misconduct in the operation, mainte-
nance, and repair of the engines. Plaintiff's decedents
purchased round trip tickets in the United States from
LOT or its agents and were returning to New York. Plain-
tiff claimed that the Soviet defendant sold the aircraft to
LOT, along with manuals and instructions for operating,
servicing, and overhauling the engines; that the Soviet de-
fendant was negligent in the design, manufacture, assem-
bly, inspection, and servicing of the aircraft and its
engines; and that it negligently gave inadequate warnings
and instructions for safe operation, maintenance, repair,
inspection, and overhaul to LOT and failed to warn LOT
and plaintiff's decedents that the aircraft and its engines
were defective.28 '
The district court concluded it lacked subject matter ju-
risdiction under the FSIA, since the foreign manufacturer
was a "foreign state" immune from thejurisdiction of fed-
eral and state courts unless the case came within the
''commercial activity" exception in the statute.
Plaintiff argued the defendant's action came within the
first clause of section 1605(a)(2), as an action "based
upon commercial activity carried on in the United
States. '28 2 The "activity" to which plaintiff pointed con-
sisted of regular flights of the Soviet airline between Mos-
cow and the United States, the fact the airline maintained
an office in the United States, and the fact that it adver-
tised in a newspaper. The court held that the Soviet air-
line's regular operation of its business in the United
States was commercial activity carried on in the United
States within the meaning of the first clause of section
1605(a)(2). The court, however, interpreted the clause
restricting subject matter jurisdiction to "an action based
upon" the commercial activity and found this action was
not based upon the Soviet defendant's activity in the
2.' Id. at 84-85.
282 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
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United States. The airline's business within the U.S. and
the advertisement had no connection to the negligence
that caused the crash. Since the alleged negligent acts
outside the United States were not an integral part of the
Soviet manufacturer's business in the United States, there
was no nexus between the cause of action asserted and the
commercial activity in the United States.28 3
Finally, the court found no jurisdiction over the Soviet
manufacturer based on the manufacturer's alleged failure
to warn the airline and passengers that the aircraft and its
engines were defective. The court found the failure to
warn not to be an "act" performed in the United States.
Furthermore, the mere failure to warn did not furnish the
minimum contacts needed to confer jurisdiction. The
court held that the Soviet defendant was immune from its
jurisdiction and dismissed the complaint as to the Soviet
defendant.28 4
C. Exceptions to FSIA
In In re Compania Mexicana de Aviacion,2 85 an action was
brought on behalf of sixty-nine Mexican decedents who
traveled on tickets purchased in Mexico for travel within
Mexico. Mexicana, the defendant airline, moved to dis-
miss the action for lack of jurisdiction because of foreign
immunity and for forum non conveniens. The motion was
denied by the district court, and Mexicana petitioned the
court for a writ of mandamus.286
The court held that Mexicana Airlines, which is wholly
owned by the Mexican Government, was a foreign state as
defined by the FSIA, the exclusive source of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over all suits involving foreign states and
their instrumentalities.28 7 Under the FSIA, a foreign state
283 Warsaw Air Crash, 716 F. Supp. at 86.
284 Id. at 87.
28. 859 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1988). For more discussion of this case, see supra
notes 271-279.
2I8 Id. at 1357.
287 Id. at 1359; see 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
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is not immune from the jurisdiction of United States
courts where its commercial activity within the United
States or outside the United States causes direct effects in
the United States.2 88 "Commercial activity carried on in
the United States by a foreign state" is defined as "com-
mercial activity carried on by such state and having sub-
stantial contact with the United States. 2 8 9 Although
Mexicana was involved in commercial activities within the
United States, that fact alone was insufficient to subject it
to the jurisdiction of the court.2 9°
A significant nexus must also exist between the cause of
action and the business practices conducted in the United
States. The plaintiffs alleged only that the airplane had
been in Chicago for servicing the day prior to the crash,
and its ultimate destination was Los Angeles.29'
Another exception to the FSIA is commercial activity
outside the United States that causes a direct effect within
thecountry.292 The plaintiffs argued that the FAA's or-
ders regulating heavy jet aircraft in the United States fleet,
which were issued because of the Mexicana crash, met
that provision. The court, however, found that the FAA
order did not constitute a direct effect for FSIA purposes.
Only deaths or injuries resulting from the negligent act
are included within the direct effect standard for acts
abroad. Indirect consequences are excluded.293
The court held that Mexicana was immune from suit
under the act because it did not waive its sovereign immu-
nity and no significant "nexus" was found between the
cause of action and the "commercial activity" carried on
in the United States. Neither an act in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity elsewhere nor an
act related to commercial activity outside the United
States that caused a direct effect within the United States
28m 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(e).
29,, Mexicana, 859 F.2d at 1360.
291 Id.
-2 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a).
2111 Mexicana, 859 F.2d at 1360.
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was established.29 4
In LeDonne v. Gulf Air, Inc. ,295 the plaintiff sought to en-
force an Illinois default judgment by arguing that, even if
the FSIA was applicable, it conferred no immunity on
Gulf Air because the underlying conduct of the default
judgment fell within the FSIA "commercial activity" ex-
ception. Gulf Air argued for the applicability of the FSIA
and, hence, the protection of immunity. Gulf Air further
contended that even if the exception applied to deprive
Gulf Air of FSIA immunity, plaintiff's claim still failed be-
cause she did not comply with the FSIA's service require-
ments. 96 The court ruled that Gulf Air was not a foreign
state, but rather it was an "agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state. 297
The court next addressed the question of whether im-
munity was conferred by the FSIA based on the acts al-
leged in the Illinois action. If immunity did attach, then
both the Illinois court and the federal court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. The court recognized
that the core of the FSIA is the distinction delineated be-
tween commercial and government activity, and that com-
mercial conduct is the principal exception to the grant of
immunity. 98 Congress did not define the distinction with
a precise, bright line. Instead, very general terms were
combined with an instruction to focus on the type of acts,
not their purposes.2 99 The court noted that Congress had
effectively delegated to the courts the task of drawing the
exact distinction on an ad hoc basis. ° °
In determining whether Gulf Air's alleged acts were
commercial in nature, the court followed the "private
party" test used in Texas Trading v. Federal Republic of Nige-
294 Id.
2- 700 F. Supp. 1400 (E.D. Va. 1988).
Id. at 1402.
297 Id. at 1405-06.
298 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
29 LeDonne, 700 F. Supp. at 1407.
300 Id.
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ria 3 0 as the key to proper application of the FSIA. In
Texas Trading, the government of Nigeria refused to pay
upon delivery of large quantities of cement ordered for a
government project. Nigeria asserted sovereign immu-
nity in the resulting lawsuits. In denying immunity, the
Second Circuit held that "if the activity is one in which a
private party could engage, [the sovereign] is not entitled
to immunity. ' 30 2 Under this test, the immunity question
turns on whether the conduct in question could be legally
engaged in by either a private party or the government, or
whether only a government could pursue the activity. In
addition to the private party test, the activities under scru-
tiny should be analyzed to determine if they are "custom-
arily carried on for profit." If so, the activities are
commercial in nature regardless of the identity of the par-
ties engaging in them.30 3
The court, in applying the private party test, held that
Gulf Air's activities alleged in the Illinois action were pri-
vate and commercial in nature so that immunity was not
appropriate under the FSIA for those acts. Plaintiff's Illi-
nois action alleged that Gulf Air made maliciously false
statements to TWA, the FBI, and other authorities to the
effect that the plaintiff had no authority to use the name of
Gulf Air or any of its employees for the purpose of ob-
taining complimentary air travel tickets. This activity was
characterized as conduct in which a private person or air-
line engaged in pursuit of commercial, for-profit airline
activities. The court found that authorizing or refusing to
authorize the issuance of complimentary air travel tickets,
and reports to authorities and to other airlines concerning
unauthorized attempts to obtain complimentary air travel
tickets, were indisputably part of the business of private,
commercial airlines. In summary, the court found Gulf
Air's alleged activities were private and commercial in na-
.0 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
3o2 Id. at 309.
so-, LeDonne, 700 F. Supp. at 1408.
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ture, thus conferring no immunity under FSIA. 30 4
In In re Air Crash Disaster near Warsaw, Poland on May 9,
1987,305 the district court concluded that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction under the FSIA over a Soviet manufac-
turer of an aircraft that was sold to LOT Polish Airlines
(LOT). The aircraft was involved in a crash and a suit was
brought on behalf of the estates of two passengers who
died in the crash. Plaintiff's decedents purchased round-
trip tickets in the United States from LOT or its agents
and were returning to New York. The plaintiff alleged
that two of the aircraft's engines failed, which caused a fire
that led to the crash. Additionally, plaintiff argued that
LOT was negligent and committed willful misconduct in
the operation, maintenance, and repair of the engines.
The Soviet defendant, according to the plaintiff, sold an
aircraft to LOT which was negligently designed, manufac-
tured, assembled, inspected, and serviced. Warnings and
instructions to LOT for the safe operation, maintenance,
repair, inspection, and overhaul were allegedly negligent.
Furthermore, the plaintiff contended that the defendants
failed to warn LOT and the plaintiff's decedents that the
aircraft and its engines were defective and unairworthy. °6
The court, without deciding whether the Soviet defend-
ant and its instrumentalities constituted a foreign state as
defined under the FSIA, considered the application of the
immunity exceptions. Plaintiff argued that the defendants
were not immune because the action was based upon both
a commercial activity carried on in the United States and
an activity performed in the United States in relation to
the.foreign state's commercial activity elsewhere. The ac-
tivities in the United States which plaintiff referred to
were regular flights of the Soviet airline to and from Mos-
cow and the United States, the airline's maintenance of an
office in the United States, and an advertisement in the
'o, Id. at 1409-10.
.o' 716 F. Supp. 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). For a similar discussion of this case, see
supra notes 280-284.
-6 Id. at 84-85.
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Wall Street Journal by the airline reciting that it supplied
aircraft, engines, and other equipment for such aircraft. °7
The court found that the airline's regular operations in
the United States qualified as commercial activities carried
on in the United States within the meaning of the FSIA.
The court, however, recognized that Congress did not ex-
ercise its full constitutional power to grant subject matter
jurisdiction. FSIA restricts subject matter jurisdiction to
actions based upon commercial activity and found that
this action was not based upon the Soviet defendant's ac-
tivity within the United States. The airline's business in
the United States and the placing of the advertisement
were not connected to the defendant's alleged negligence
in causing the crash. The decedents did not have dealings
or contacts with the airline's business or with the adver-
tisement. The activities outside the United States were
not an integral part of the airline's United States business
or of the advertisement. No nexus existed between the
cause of action and the commercial activities conducted in
the United States. 0 8
Plaintiff further asserted that the action was based upon
ar act performed in the United States in connection with
the foreign state's commercial activity elsewhere. The act
performed here by the Soviet defendant, as contended by
the plaintiff, was the failure to warn LOT and the dece-
dents that the aircraft and its engines were defective and
unairworthy. The court held that the failure to warn was
insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction under
the FSIA over a foreign manufacturer of an aircraft. Fur-
ther, the mere failure to warn by defendant did not confer
jurisdiction because the necessary minimum contacts were
absent. Therefore, the court decided that the Soviet de-
fendant was immune from the jurisdiction of all United
States courts and did not come within the commercial ac-
tivity exception of the statute.309
.07 Id. at 86.
I d.
30 Id. at 87.
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In America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd. ,3 0 a fed-
eral court properly dismissed a suit in which America
West Airlines (America West) sought to recover damages
that had allegedly occurred as a result of faulty engine
maintenance work performed in Ireland by a foreign cor-
poration. The appellate court upheld the district court's
ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The for-
eign defendant undisputedly fell within the FSIA defini-
tion of a foreign state. Subject matter jurisdiction in the
dispute depended upon whether the defendants were en-
titled to sovereign immunity.
In this case, no dispute existed that a second defendant,
Airmotive, was engaged in commercial activity through its
engine overhaul work. The court found the fact that the
Republic of Ireland carried on commercial activities in the
United States was insufficient to create jurisdiction under
the applicable FSIA clause.3 1
The court concluded that there was not a nexus be-
tween America West's cause of action and any of the com-
mercial activities carried on by Ireland in the United
States. America West alleged only that the defendant op-
erated a commercial airline that carried passengers be-
tween the United States and Ireland. America West's
claim did not in any way relate to the airline's commercial
operations. The specific acts that formed the basis of the
suit were the engine maintenance activities of Airmotive,
which took place solely in Ireland. Thus, the first clause
of the FSIA commercial exceptions did not divest these
defendants of sovereign immunity. 2
America West further argued that the FSIA immunity
exception relating to commercial activities carried on
abroad causing a direct effect in the United States
divested the defendants of sovereign immunity. The fi-
nancial losses America West incurred as a result of Airmo-
tive's allegedly faulty maintenance were argued as a direct
877 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1989).
" Id. at 796-97.
1' Id. at 797.
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effect for purposes of FSIA. The appellate court, in
agreement with most courts that have analyzed the direct
effect clause, held that the foreign sovereign's activities
must cause an effect in the United States that is substantial
and foreseeable in order to abrogate sovereign immunity.
Mere financial loss incurred by a United States corpora-
tion is insufficent to constitute a direct effect for FSIA
purposes. 3
Applying the substantial and foreseeable effect test, the
court found no direct effect and, thus, no subject matter
jurisdiction. From Airmotive's standpoint, its mainte-
nance activities in Ireland would not foreseeably have an
effect in the United States. According to the evidence,
when Airmotive performed work on the aircraft engine,
which was still owned by GPA, it was not aware that the
engine would be used in the United States. America West
failed to adequately rebut this evidence. The court found
that the United States contacts were fortuitous and de-
pended solely on the fact that the injured corporation
happened to be American. The effect in the United States
from Airmotive's allegedly improper repair work was not
direct enough to deprive Airmotive of sovereign immu-
nity. The court concluded that no subject matter jurisdic-
tion was established. 4
D. Statute of Limitations
In Burke v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,31 5 the plaintiffs
filed suit in the United States District Court of Puerto
Rico against Air France for mental anguish and anxiety
allegedly suffered when their aircraft developed engine
trouble and began to shake. Upon expiration of the six-
month period for service of process, the judge ordered
the plaintiffs to show cause why the action should not be
dismissed for lack of service on the defendant. The plain-
tiffs filed for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, rather
-, Id. at 799.
3,4 Id. at 800.
--5 699 F. Supp. 1016 (D.P.R. 1988).
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than respond, and then refiled the lawsuit.3 6
Defendant's motion to dismiss for expiration of the
statute of limitations and failure to state a claim was
before the court. A one-year statute of limitations applies
to tort actions in Puerto Rico.3 17 Defendant contended
that the action was time-barred because the incident giv-
ing rise to the suit occurred on February 21, 1986, and
the suit was not filed until December 17, 1987.
In most states, the court stated, the defendant's posi-
tion would be correct. The statute of limitations would be
tolled for no greater period than the time that the volun-
tarily dismissed suit was pending, and the statute would
have run on October 26, 1987. The civil law in Puerto
Rico, however, mandated a different result. The district
court looked to the First Circuit holding in Silva- Wiscovich
v. Weber Dental Mfg. Co. ,318 which held that when a case
under Puerto Rico law is voluntarily dismissed without
prejudice in federal court before service, the statute of
limitations is tolled in the common law sense and begins
to run anew as of the dismissal date." 9
The defendant attempted to distinguish Silva- Wiscovich
because, in the present case, the six-month period in
which to serve the defendant had expired and an order to
show cause had been issued prior to the voluntary dismis-
sal. The court rejected this distinction and applied the
reasoning of Silva-Wiscovich to this case. 320 Therefore, the
suit was not time-barred by Puert6 Rico's one-year statute
of limitations for tort actions.
Also, since defendant Air France was a corporation al-
most wholly owned by the government of France, it fell
within the provisions of the FSIA. No immunity from the
jurisdiction of the United States courts existed because
the operation of an airline meets the commercial activity
li6 Id. at 1016. See also P.R. R. Civ. P. 4.3(b); FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
1,7 P.R. Civ. CODE, art. 1868, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5298.
835 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1987).
Id. at 410.
320 Burke, 699 F. Supp. at 1018.
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exception under the FSIA.3 2 t
E. Jury Trial
In Matton v. British Airways Board, Inc. ,322 the plaintiff was
injured as a result of the defendant's alleged negligence
while the plaintiff was making a truck delivery at the de-
fendant's loading dock. At the time the plaintiff sustained
his injuries, the British government owned the defendant.
The British government divested itself of its majority
stock ownership of the defendant three years later. The
defendant had become a private corporation that was no
longer owned or operated by the government.123
The plaintiffs commenced their action in state court.
The defendant then removed it to the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York on the grounds that
the defendant was a foreign state within the meaning of
the FSIA.3 4 The FSIA provides for a nonjury trial when a
foreign state is a defendant in any litigation.325 The plain-
tiffs served their demand for a jury trial shortly after
learning that the British government had divested its in-
terest in the defendant.
The defendant argued that, because federal subject
matter jurisdiction properly was obtained ab initio, juris-
diction would generally not be lost due to post-com-
mencement events. The basis for jurisdiction remained
pursuant to the FSIA, disregarding the privatization of
British Airways, and the FSIA's nonjury requirement re-
mained in effect. The plaintiffs conceded that as long as
the defendant was owned by the British government, a
jury demand would have been improper.3 26 The plaintiffs
contended that the post-removal privatization of the de-
fendant had fundamentally changed the manner in which
I d. at 1019.
"2 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,046 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). For further discussion of this
case, see supra notes 262-270 and accompanying text.
323 Id. at 18,047.
4 Id.
32., 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), § 1330(a).
526 Matton, 21 Av. Cas. at 18,047; see FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
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the mandates of the FSIA must be read.3 27
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs' assertion,
holding that once a foreign state no longer has any inter-
est in a defendant agency or instrumentality, congres-
sional concern with the sensitivity of actions involving
foreign states is no longer involved. The legislative his-
tory of the FSIA indicates that nonjury trials were favored
because of uniformity in decision-making, the foreign
state's lack of familiarity with jury trials, and a fear of
overly generous damage awards when a deep pocket is in-
volved. Those reasons were not applicable once the de-
fendant in the action no longer met the FSIA definition of
a foreign state's agency or instrumentality. The court
found no basis for expanding the FSIA dictates beyond
their intended purposes. The defendant's contention that
the FSIA continued to provide the court with subject mat-
ter jurisdiction was ruled irrelevant to the issue of
whether the FSIA foreclosed a jury trial in the instant
case. Therefore, the court denied the defendant's motion
to strike the plaintiff's jury demand.3 28
In Burke, passengers of an aircraft who were seeking to
recover damages for mental anguish and anxiety allegedly
suffered when Air France's aircraft developed engine
trouble were not entitled to a jury trial because jurisdic-
tion was asserted over the airline under FSIA provi-
sions329 Defendant Air France was a corporation almost
fully owned by the French government and was therefore
an agency or instrumentality of France under the FSIA.
The court found that Air France had immunity from the
jurisdiction of United States courts.3 3 0
United States courts have jurisdiction over a foreign
state as to any claim for relief with respect to which it is
not entitled to immunity,33 I but the Burke court found that
327Malton, 21 Av. Cas. at 18,047.
'2 Id. at 18,048.
329 699 F. Supp. at 1019. For further discussion of this case, see supra notes
315-321 and accompanying text.
0 /d.
33 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
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jurisdiction was allowed only over nonjury actions. The
court stated that Congress was not required to allow jury
trials because at common law no civil actions were al-
lowed against foreign states, and thus the seventh amend-
ment is inapplicable. Therefore, the plaintiffs were not
entitled to a jury trial, and the defendant's motion to
strike the jury demand was granted." 2
F. Damages
In Burke, the defendant contended that the plaintiffs did
not state a claim upon which relief could be granted be-
cause their mental distress was "nonserious." The district
court recognized that traditionally, under common law,
recovery has only been allowed for emotional or mental
distress if the plaintiff had also experienced physical in-
jury-the "impact" rule. The impact rule has been broad-
ened in many jurisdictions to allow recovery by a plaintiff,
not physically injured, who was in the "zone of danger" at
the time when another person was physically injured. The
court recognized that some jurisdictions, such as Califor-
nia, went so far as to allow recovery for serious mental
distress when the plaintiff is in physical, temporal, and re-
lational proximity to a person physically harmed-the
"bystander proximity doctrine." The rule requires that
the plaintiff must be near the accident, must observe it,
and must be closely related to the victim. 33" In the civil
law system in Puerto Rico, however, no distinction is
drawn between types of damages. Pursuant to Puerto Ri-
can law, mental suffering is generally as compensable as
physical harm. 34
The court stated that, although some common law prin-
ciples have been introduced judicially into Puerto Rican
tort law, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has specifically
held that common law limits on liability for mental and
emotional damages fundamentally conflict with Puerto Ri-
1.1 Burke, 699 F. Supp. at 1019.
-. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
34 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968).
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can judicial tradition and principles and would not be
adopted . 3 5 The court relied on the First Circuit's deci-
sion in Room v. Caribe Hilton Hotel 3 6 which allowed a
plaintiff to recover damages for mental suffering, without
any accompanying physical injury. Tort liability under
Puerto Rican law requires proof of only three elements:
(1) negligent or culpable conduct; (2) harm; and (3) a le-
gally sufficient causal connection between the conduct
and the harm.33 7
After examining all of the relevant cases, the district
court held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged the
three elements of a claim for damages under Article 1802
of the Puerto Rican Civil Code, which does not limit re-
covery for mental anguish. 3 The court found the plain-
tiff had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted,
and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. 3
IV. WARSAW CONVENTION
A. Injuries and Events Within the Scope of the Jurisdiction of
the Warsaw Convention
Shinn v. El Al Israel Airlines,340 arose under the Warsaw
Convention, Article 17, which subjects a carrier to liability
for damage sustained in the event of a death, wounding,
or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the
occurrence takes place on board an aircraft or in the
course of embarking or disembarking.3 4I Therefore, if the
plaintiff was not engaged in embarking, the air carrier is
not liable for injuries under the Convention. Evidence re-
vealed the plaintiffs had arrived at the airport some two
hours before the flight. The airplane which they were to
board had not yet arrived, and they were in a public access
335 Burke, 699 F. Supp. at 1019.
36 659 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981).
3s7 Burke, 699 F. Supp. at 1019.
-" Id.
"' Id.
34o 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,331 (D. Colo. 1989).
341 Id. at 18,332.
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area at the time of the attack. The court held that the
plaintiff was not engaging in embarking and, therefore,
granted defendant's motion to dismiss.342
In Gilbert v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc. ,4 a jury awarded
the plaintiff $25,000 for emotional distress and mental
anguish she experienced prior to being struck by a run-
away bar cart not secured during takeoff. Defendant Pan
Am contended that a cause of action for emotional injury,
unaccompanied by fear of impending death, was not avail-
able under the Warsaw Convention. The district court re-
jected the defendant's contentions and held that a
legitimate fear of impending death was not an absolute
condition for recovery of damages for pre-impact emo-
tional distress.3 44
In the alternative, the defendant challenged the award
of damages as excessive. The court found that although
the award was generous, it was not excessive in light of
evidence that the passenger observed that the cart was not
secured and understood that she was not only in danger,
but in serious danger, given the weight of the cart and the
velocity with which it could be expected to bear down
upon her. Because the plaintiff was a former flight attend-
ant, she was uniquely qualified to appreciate the peril.
Under the circumstances, the jury was entitled to accept
the passenger's testimony that she feared for her life or
feared that she would receive maiming injuries.34 5 With
respect to the jury's award to the plaintiff's husband for
expenses, including medical expenses, the court reached
a different conclusion, finding the award excessive. The
court found an insufficient evidentiary basis with which to
justify the award beyond the documented medical and
non-medical expenses resulting from his wife's injuries. 4 6
In In re Hijacking of Pan Am World Airways, Inc., Aircraft
542 Id. at 18,334.
.4-, 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,482. (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
.4 Id. at 18,483.
34. Id. at 18,483-84.
_146 Id. at 18,484.
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Sept. 5, 1986) 4 plaintiff alleged that defendant Pan Am
engaged in willful misconduct associated with the hi-
jacking of its aircraft by fraudulently inducing plaintiffs to
fly on Pan Am with promises of heightened security.
Plaintiffs further asserted that Pan Am willfully failed to
provide them with adequate security. 48 Pan Am moved
for a partial summary judgment, contending that it had
not engaged in willful misconduct as that term is defined
in the Warsaw Convention.349
The parties disputed the extent to which the defendant
deliberately refrained from providing adequate security at
the Karachi International Airport. Defendant contended
that the amount of security provided was within the sole
discretion of the Pakistani government. Plaintiffs claimed,
on the other hand, that Pan Am could have hired addi-
tional armed security guards and that the defendant, as
well as other airlines, had done so in the past. Each side
presented affidavits to support their contentions.3 50 The
court found that, as a matter of law, it could not hold that
the defendant's failure to provide adequate security rose
to the level of reckless disregard sufficient to constitute
willful misconduct (defined under the Warsaw Conven-
tion to be either intentional performance of an act with
knowledge it would result in injury or performance of an
act in such a manner as to imply recklessness). A rational
jury could have concluded that, prior to the hijacking, the
airline engaged in a campaign to advertise its security pro-
gram and induce concerned passengers to travel despite
fears of terrorist activities.35'
In Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines,352 the court held
that an airline which received a telephone call stating that
a passenger's luggage contained a bomb, was not respon-
sible or liable under the Warsaw Convention for any ac-
-147 713 F. Supp. 1483 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
348 Id.
3411 Id.
"' Id. at 1484.
I' d.
875 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1989).
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tions taken by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in
detaining, searching, and questioning the passenger for
more than five hours. 53 After receiving the call, the Chi-
cago Air Traffic Control Center notified Lufthansa in
Frankfurt, the FBI, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
and the Air Traffic Control Center in Canada. The Cana-
dian Air Traffic Control Center radioed the flight and in-
formed the pilot that a bomb was in the plaintiff's luggage
or on her person. The pilot received permission to make
an emergency landing in Canada.354
After the plane landed, all passengers deplaned, and
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police took plaintiff into
custody. After searching her handbag, they transported
her in a military car to the terminal building. At the ter-
minal building she was questioned about the bomb threat,
and a female officer conducted a personal search of plain-
tiff. At no time did plaintiff object to being searched or
questioned, nor did she state that she wanted to leave.
After the investigation concluded, all passengers, includ-
ing plaintiff, reboarded the plane and completed the flight
to Frankfurt. 55
The plaintiff sued the airline under the Warsaw Con-
vention for slander, battery, false arrest, false imprison-
ment, intentional infliction of emotional stress, and failure
to warn. She alleged that the $75,000 liability cap con-
tained in the Warsaw Convention did not apply because
defendant's actions amounted to willful misconduct. The
lower court, applying Illinois law, had dismissed her fail-
ure to warn claim for not stating a claim upop which relief
could be granted, and granted defendant's summaryjudg-
3' Id. at 615.
34 Id. at 615-16. During flight, the pilot had an attendant bring the plaintiff
forward so he could speak with her. The attendant took the plaintiff by the arm
and led her to the cockpit. The pilot informed the plaintiff about the telephone
call and asked whether or not she knew anything about it. She replied that she
knew nothing about it. The pilot requested that plaintiff remain in the cockpit to




ment motion as to the rest of her tort claims. The trial
court held that, under the circumstances, defendant's ac-
tions were justified. 56
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, plaintiff argued that
under the Warsaw Convention and Illinois law, defendant
was liable for the injuries she allegedly sustained due to
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's detention and per-
sonal search. The court based its decision on Article 17
of the Warsaw Convention which states that an airline is
liable for injuries if they take place aboard the aircraft or
in the course of embarking or disembarking.35 7 The court
concluded that the defendant could not be held liable
under the Warsaw Convention for the actions of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police unless detention of the plaintiff
occurred on the plane or in the course of embarking or
disembarking. 358
In deciding whether the detention and search of the
plaintiff occurred in the course of embarking or dis-
embarking, the court looked to tests used in other cir-
cuits. The First, Second, and Third Circuits view three
factors as primarily relevant to the determination of liabil-
ity under Article 17: "location of the accident; the activity
which the injured person was engaged in; and the control
by the airline over the injured person. ' ' 359 The Ninth Cir-
cuit uses a slightly different test requiring an assessment
of the total circumstances surrounding the passenger's in-
juries. The location of the passenger was only one of sev-
eral factors to be considered. 60
The Seventh Circuit held that in looking at the total cir-
cumstances surrounding the plaintiff's detainment and
search, placing particular emphasis on location, activity
and control, any injury sustained by the plaintiff due to
I3 d. at 616.
457 Id.
.,- Id. at 617.
, Id. (quoting Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.
1977)).
-- Schroeder, 875 F.2d at 617; see also Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 549 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1979).
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the actions of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police was not
sustained while embarking or disembarking from the
plane. The court concluded that the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police conducted their detention and search of
plaintiff at the terminal building, away from the aircraft.
Secondly, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police questioned
the plaintiff about a bomb threat, which was not related to
passengers embarking or disembarking from an airplane.
Finally, defendant had no control whatsoever over the
plaintiff or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police while the
police detained and searched her.16 1
The court further stated that the legislative history of
the Warsaw Convention clearly established that a propo-
sal which would have made an airline liable for all injuries
sustained by passengers entering the airport of departure
until leaving the airport of arrival was rejected. 62 There-
fore, since injury plaintiff allegedly suffered due to her de-
tainment and search was not sustained on the plane or
during embarking or disembarking, defendant could not
be held liable for those injuries under Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention. 63 The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's granting of defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment.3 6
B. Jurisdiction
In Steber v. British Caledonian Airways, Ltd.3 65 plaintiffs
filed a complaint in the Mobile County Circuit Court (Ala-
bama) against British Caledonian Airways, Ltd., Delta Air
Lines, and Eastern Airlines, seeking damages for the loss
of their baggage while flying on these airlines. Delta and
Eastern were granted summary judgments. British Cale-
donian was dismissed as a party for lack of jurisdiction
mil Schroeder, 875 F.2d at 617-18.
_162 Id.; see also Martinez Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279, 282 (1st Cir.
1976).
Schroeder, 875 F.2d at 618.
Id. at 624.
", 549 So. 2d 986 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989).
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and plaintiffs appealed that dismissal.' 66
Article 28(a) of the Warsaw Convention restricts where
a claim may be brought: the domicile of the carrier, its
principal place of business, where the contract was made,
or the place of destination. 6 7 Plaintiffs purchased round-
trip tickets on Delta from Mobile, Alabama to London,
England. In Mobile, the plaintiffs were placed on Eastern
Airlines for a flight to Atlanta, Georgia. Upon arrival in
Atlanta, the plaintiffs, with assistance of Delta employees,
were transferred to British Caledonian for the trip from
Atlanta to London. The plaintiffs' baggage did not ac-
company them on this flight to London. The facts
showed that neither the domicile nor principal place of
business of British Caledonian is in Alabama. Further-
more, the facts failed to show that the contract of carriage
was made between the plaintiffs and British Caledonian in
Mobile County. Therefore, British Caledonian would not
properly be under the jurisdiction of the Alabama
court. 68
The court applied the rationale of In re Alleged Food
Poisoning Incident, March 1984,69 in determining whether,
under the Warsaw Convention, an undivided transporta-
tion may have more than one destination if more than one
carrier, or successive carriers, are parties to the contract
of transportation. The court stated that the destination of
a journey for convention purposes is determined by the
intent of the parties. 7 ° If the parties regarded the trans-
portation as a single, undivided operation, the beginning
of that operation is the origin and the end of the opera-
,- Id. at 986.
67 Warsaw Convention, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, art. 28(a), 49 Stat.
3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982).
The article provides: "An action for damages may be brought, at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the high contracting parties, either before the
court of the domicile of the carrier, or of his principal place of business, or where
he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before
the court at the place of destination." Id.
Steber, 549 So.2d at 987.
770 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1985).
,70 Steber, 549 So. 2d at 988.
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tion is the destination. Additionally, the court decided
that this interpretation was supported by Article 1(2) of
the Convention, which uses the term destination in the
singular for an undivided transportation.3
In relying on In re Alleged Food Poisoning Incident, the
court found plaintiffs' ultimate destination was Mobile,
Alabama. The court regarded Eastern and British Cale-
donian as successive carriers in the plaintiffs' round-trip
journey. Therefore, the court held that the parties con-
templated a single, undivided transportation by successive
carriers on the plaintiffs' round-trip journey and that the
plaintiffs' destination was, in the meaning of the Warsaw
Convention, always at the place where the journey
originated. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment
dismissing British Caledonian as a party defendant and
remanded the cause for further proceedings. 72
C. Cargo and Passenger Baggage Claims
In Arkin v. New York Helicopter Corporation,373 the court
found that, under the Warsaw Convention, the air carrier
was not entitled to limit its liability for bags to $20.00 per
kilogram. The carrier had not complied with the specific
provisions of Article 4 of the Warsaw Convention. Article
4 requires that the number and weight of the passenger's
checked baggage be noted on the passenger's ticket and
baggage checks.
The plaintiffs checked two pieces of baggage with New
York Helicopter Corporation before traveling to JFK In-
ternational Airport where they boarded British Airways to
London. Upon their arrival in London, plaintiffs' baggage
was not available. It appeared that upon arrival at JFK,
the bags were unloaded from the helicopter but not deliv-
ered to British Airways until the next morning. The bags
were left at the British Airways baggage room which was
.71 Id.; see also 770 F.2d at 5-6.
-72 Steber, 549 So.2d at 989.
.7 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17163 (N.Y. App. Div. July 27, 1989).
.74 ld. at 17,164; see also Warsaw Convention, supra note 367, art. 4.
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closed at the time. The luggage was never found. There
was no dispute that the number and weight of the plain-
tiffs' checked baggage were not noted on the ticket, nor
on the baggage check delivered to the plaintiffs. 75
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held
that New York Helicopter Corporation was not entitled to
limit its liability to $9.07 per pound ($20.00 per kilogram)
because the carrier failed to comply with the specific pro-
visions of Article 4 of the Convention requiring certain
information be made known to the passenger. The de-
fendant argued that the absence of such information was
insubstantial; it did not prejudice the passenger and did
not warrant the drastic remedy of voiding its limit of lia-
bility under the Convention. The defendant further ar-
gued that the better rule was that found in cases
construing Article 4 as a technical and formal requirement
which has no current practical applicability today. 6
The court concluded that the stricter interpretation of
the Warsaw Convention was the better construction,
quoting Gill v. Lufthansa German Airlines3 77 in support:
The language should be given its plain meaning and ef-
fect. Article 4 is straightforward. Nor [sic] is it over de-
manding. Only three elements on the claim check are
absolutely required to preserve liability limitations: notice,
ticket number, and number and weight of the bags. ...
Loss of the check and absence of the other required data
do not vitiate the limitations. In view of the fact that the
Warsaw Convention limitg the carrier's liability and shifts
a greater part of the responsibility and risk to the passen-
ger, it is not unreasonable or overly technical to require
the carrier to comply with the minimum requirements
plainly set out by the Convention.378
The court found that the text of Article 4 should be given
its plain meaning.3 79
37 Arkin, 3 Av. L. Rep. at 17,164.
3W! Id.
377 620 F. Supp. 1453 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
37. Gill, 620 F. Supp. at 1456, quoted in Arkin, 3 Av. L. Rep. at 17,165.
371 Arkin, 3 Av. L. Rep. at 17,165.
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In Schmoldt Importing Co. v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc.,380 the fact that an air carrier retained a cargo of hats
shipped from China for twenty-six days did not terminate
the international character of the shipment and render the
Warsaw Convention inapplicable to a claim for damages
against the carrier. Specifically, Schmoldt Importing
(Schmoldt) hired Pan Am to ship its goods from China to
Oklahoma. Pan Am retained the goods for twenty-six
days before turning the goods over to the connecting car-
rier, Continental Airlines. Continental Airlines received
the goods in damaged condition from Pan Am and
stamped "received damaged" on the air waybill. Upon re-
ceipt of the goods, a Schmoldt representative signed the
air waybill, noting, "one box opened prior to inspec-
tion. ' " 38  Schmoldt subsequently wrote a more detailed
complaint and mailed it to Pan Am. The plaintiff alleged
the goods were unfit for resale and sought damages
against Pan Am due to the one month delay in delivery. 82
The court concluded that Schmoldt made a timely written
complaint to Pan Am for damages to the goods in compli-
ance with notice provisions of the Warsaw Convention,
but did not make a timely complaint with respect to the
delayed delivery of the goods. The Convention requires
that persons entitled to delivery must complain to the car-
rier within seven days if the goods were damaged or
within fourteen days if the goods were delayed. Article
26(2) and (3), viewed in conjunction, set forth two re-
quirements for maintaining an action against the carrier:
the person entitled to delivery must make a timely written
complaint and the carrier must thereby be notified of
either delay or damage during transportation, or both.38 3
The court found that Schmoldt's notation on the air
waybill constituted a complaint because it indicated some
meddling with the merchandise. The facts revealed the
767 P.2d 411 (Okla. 1989).
Id. at 412.
.2 Id. at 413.
., Id. at 413-16.
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complaint was made on the day of receipt and well within
the seven-day period allowed by Article 26(2). Continen-
tal's notation that the goods were, in fact, physically dam-
aged notified Pan Am of the damage. Therefore, the
Article did not bar Schmoldt's cause of action for physical
damage to the goods. Since the notations made by
Schmoldt alluded only to the physical damage to the
goods and not to the delayed delivery, however, that part
of Schmoldt's claim which included damages for delay was
barred by Article 26 because of its fourteen-day notifica-
tion requirement.3 4 The trial court's summary judgment
was reversed insofar as it affected Schmoldt's right to re-
cover for damaged goods. It was affirmed as a partial
summary adjudication denying Schmoldt's recovery for
delay in the delivery of the goods.
In Vekris v. Peoples Express Airlines, Inc. 385 an international
airline was not entitled to limited liability under the War-
saw Convention because it neglected to follow the strict
provisions of Article 4 of the Convention concerning the
proper preparation of baggage checks. Prior to boarding,
plaintiff checked two pieces of personal property, a canvas
suitcase and a cardboard tube, and was issued a baggage
claim stub for each piece. Plaintiff alleged that Peoples
Express did not weigh the baggage, write plaintiff's ticket
number on either claim check, or write the number of
bags on either claim check. When the cardboard tube was
lost, plaintiff sought damages for the loss of the original
art work contained in the tube.38 6 Defendant countered
that its liability was limited by the Warsaw Convention to
$9.07 per pound.
The court held that in order to enjoy the protection of
Article 22(2) of the Warsaw Convention, a carrier must
take specific steps with respect to baggage checks. Article
4(3) requires a baggage check issued to a passenger to
contain, inter alia, the number of the passenger's ticket,
.84 Id.
IH5 707 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
-, Id. at 675-76.
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the number and weight of the packages the passenger is
checking, and a statement that the flight is subject to the
liability rules established by the Warsaw Convention. Ar-
ticle 4 further provides that "if the baggage check does
not contain the particulars listed above, the carrier should
not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of the
Convention which exclude or limit his liability. '387 The
court concluded that in cases involving noncommercial
airline passengers, Article 4 must be interpreted literally:
travelers must be notified of the exact weight of the bag-
gage so they will know the limit of the airline's liability.
Since the effect of the Warsaw Convention is to keep lia-
bility of the airlines artificially low, it is not unreasonable
to require that carriers comply with the strict require-
ments of Article 4 before availing themselves of its liabil-
ity limits.3 88
The court rejected the defendant's argument that, since
the plaintiff's paintings were intended for sale, they were
not baggage for which the defendant was responsible.
The court held that the defendant, having accepted pay-
ment for transit and having treated the paintings as bag-
gage, could not now claim they were not baggage.
Therefore, the court found that the paintings were within
the term "baggage" as defined by the tariff and the de-
fendant's own conduct. 389
In Shapiro v. United Airlines,390 plaintiff sued United Air-
lines for delay in delivery of his checked luggage, alleging
breach of contract and negligence, and seeking compen-
satory and punitive damages. United claimed that its lia-
bility to the plaintiff was limited as set forth in the
"Condition of Contract" and that plaintiff had already re-
ceived $100 from United, or $60 more than plaintiff's
documented expenses. The court granted United's mo-
.187 Id. at 767 (citing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502, art. 4(3)(d)).
Vekris, 707 F. Supp. at 676.
i" ld. at 678-79.
3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17,394 (E.D.N.Y. August 30, 1989).
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tion for summary judgment.39 '
It is well established that federal common law governs
the validity of an air carrier's limitation of liability. 92
Under the "released valuation doctrine," a carrier may
validly limit its liability to an agreed value of the goods,
provided the following conditions are met: the carrier
gives its passengers a fair opportunity to choose between
higher and lower liability by paying a greater or lesser fee;
the passenger is aware of the opportunity to pay a higher
price for greater coverage; and the passenger, with full
knowledge, chooses to pay for lesser coverage. 93
United provided the plaintiff with an opportunity to de-
clare a higher value for his baggage, and the plaintiff re-
ceived reasonable notice of that opportunity. Plaintiff's
ticket contained the words "Passenger Ticket and Bag-
gage Check Subject To Conditions of Contract on Passen-
ger's Coupon".39 4 The ticket also included the notice of
baggage liability limitations which alerted a ticket holder
that "liability for ... delay ... is limited unless a higher
value is declared in advance, and additional charges are
paid. '3 9 5 Furthermore, Paragraph 12 of the "Conditions
of Contract" noted that United had tariff rules regarding
limitations of baggage liability and that the rules were
available for inspection at a United ticket counter or from
United's consumer affairs department. The court con-
cluded this information provided plaintiff with reasonable
notice that United's liability for damages caused by the
delay would be limited unless a passenger took affirmative
action to pay for higher coverage, or the airline gave no
opportunity to pay a higher amount for greater coverage.
Under this test, United's limitation of liability was found
valid.3 96
The court found no merit in the plaintiff's allegation
-' Id. at 17,396.
392 See Deiro v. American Airlines, Inc. 816 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987).
s- Shapiro, 3 Av. L. Rep. at 17,397; see also Deiro, 816 F.2d at 1365.
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that United's actions amounted to gross negligence and
that a valid limitation of liability could not insulate it from
liability for that negligence. The court concluded that
where interstate carriage is concerned, only an appropria-
tion of property by the carrier for its own use will nullify a
proper limitation of liability. The facts revealed that
United did not convert plaintiff's baggage to its own use,
but, instead, returned the baggage within thirteen hours.
Therefore, the plaintiff could not recover an amount
greater than the tariff limit, regardless of the degree of
United's negligence. 9 7 Also, United's tariff entitled
plaintiff to all reasonable documented expenses incurred
as a direct result of delay in the delivery. The evidence
revealed that the only reasonable, documented expense
plaintiff incurred was $40 for replacement of medication.
Since United had already paid plaintiff $100 before the
action began, United owed plaintiff nothing and was enti-
tled to summary judgment.3 9
In Campbell v. Air Jamaica,3 99 a federal trial court erred in
dismissing a passenger's claim involving a cancelled inter-
national flight, flight delays, and lost luggage. The Sec-
ond Circuit held that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention. Under the
Warsaw Convention, an action for damages must be
brought, at the option of the plaintiff, where the carrier is
domiciled, where the carrier's principal place of business
is located, where the carrier has a place of business
through which the contract had been made, or where the
final place of destination is located. °
The Second Circuit found that the trial court improp-
erly concluded the carrier did not have "a place of busi-
ness through which the contract had been made" in the
United States. 40 ' Although it was clear from the passen-
, Id.
""Id.
863 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1988).
4,N) Id. at 1-2.
41, Id. at 2.
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ger's ticket that the place through which the ticket was
purchased was Jamaica, a closer factual inquiry was re-
quired because the passenger had submitted to the trial
court an affidavit alleging that the ticket was purchased in
New York city on his behalf. Arguments on appeal
demonstrated that the passenger should be allowed to
conduct discovery on that point. The case was remanded
to the trial court to determine whether the airline had a
place of business in the United States through which the
contract was made, thereby giving the United States inter-
national or treaty jurisdiction. °2
In Duff v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,403 the plaintiff trav-
eled to New York and many different foreign countries
during a seven week period. The plaintiff returned from
Madrid to New York and was scheduled to take a Trans
World Airlines (TWA) flight to Chicago. That flight was
delayed approximately four hours. The plaintiff filed a
complaint against TWA, alleging that the airline failed to
leave New York at the scheduled departure time, negli-
gently damaged his luggage, and lost or damaged items in
his luggage. 40 4  TWA filed a motion for summary
judgment.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment to
TWA on plaintiff's claim regarding baggage and lost
items. The court further granted summary judgment in
favor of TWA on plaintiff's remaining claims alleging
damages due to the flight delay. TWA contended that
summary judgment was appropriate, based upon (1) the
Warsaw Convention, (2) the contractual terms of the
TWA airline ticket issued to the plaintiff, and (3) plain-
tiff's lack of any damage occasioned by his delayed
departure.40 5
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's
decision and held that the trial court did not err in relying
402 Id.
. 173 Il1. App. 3d 266, 527 N.E.2d 498 (1988).
4- Id. at 266, 527 N.E.2d at 499.
405 Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502.
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upon provisions of the Warsaw Convention in granting
summary judgment in favor of the airline. Further, the
court held that the airline tickets for those flights con-
tained an adequate Warsaw Convention notice. The court
found it was clear that the passenger contracted for inter-
national travel when he purchased tickets and that his re-
turn flight from New York to Chicago was part of his
overall international travel and did not constitute a truly
domestic flight.40 6 The appeals court affirmed the trial
court's decision denying the airline's motion for the as-
sessment of sanctions against the passenger because the
case was not one in which sanctions were appropriate. 407
D. Damages
In Gilbert v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. ,4o8 the dis-
trict court found that the Warsaw Convention did not spe-
cifically bar a derivative claim by the husband of a
passenger who was injured aboard an international flight.
The husband, who was not physically injured, sought to
recover damages for medical expenses and for the loss of
the society and comfort of his wife. The action was before
the court on defendant's motion in limine, which sought
exclusion from trial of all evidence offered by the plaintiff
in connection with the husband's cause of action. Defend-
ant argued that the Warsaw Convention barred any recov-
ery by the spouse of an injured passenger.40 9
The District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that the Warsaw Convention does not specifi-
cally preclude the recovery by spouses of damages for loss
of consortium or medical expenses. Subsection 2 of Arti-
cle 24 presupposes that there would be Warsaw Conven-
tion plaintiffs, other than passengers, suing for damages
suffered. Therefore, the court reasoned, the Convention
did not specifically bar recovery on the derivative claim by
406 173 Ill. App. 3d at 266, 527 N.E.2d at 500-01.
407 Id.
4o, 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,482 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
409 Id. at 18,483.
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the spouse.41 0 The court, however, found no merit in the
defendant's contention that even if the Convention did
not explicitly bar derivative suits, the Convention should
be applied to the accident and preclude recovery not spe-
cifically provided for by the treaty.4 '
In Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. ,412 an Eastern flight began
to lose altitude after its three jet engines failed. After one
engine was restarted, the flight subsequently landed
safely, but Eastern was sued by twenty-five passengers on
the flight. Twenty-three of the passengers brought suit
claiming damages solely for mental distress arising out of
the incident. The claims were based on intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress under Florida law and under
the Warsaw Convention.1 3 The district court held that
the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted under either Florida or federal law.4 1 4
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit looked to the face of
the complaint and accepted its allegations as true. The
court addressed the state law claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the cause of action under the
Warsaw Convention for emotional injury, the claim for
punitive damages pursuant to Article 25 of the Warsaw
Convention, preemption of plaintiff's state law claim for
punitive damages, guidance on remand with respect to
willful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention, and de-
nial of leave to amend the complaint.41 5
The plaintiffs first alleged that Eastern's maintenance
personnel responsible for the flight had failed to install
the required oil seals or "big O-rings" necessary to pre-
vent oil leaks. Second, they alleged that Eastern's records
revealed that the aircraft had experienced a dozen prior
engine failures stemming from the absence of O-rings.
Finally, they alleged that Eastern knowingly failed to insti-
41o Id. at 18,484.
411 Id.
412 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989).




86 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
tute appropriate procedures to correct the problem.
Based on these allegations, the plaintiffs sought damages
for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Flor-
ida law, but the court held that the issue could not be re-
solved until the Florida Supreme Court made a decision
regarding a similar incident.4 6
The court recognized that the Warsaw Convention cre-
ates a cause of action including the right to recover for
purely emotional injuries. The court's conclusion did not
mean that the courts would allow recovery for every claim
for mental injury up to $75,000. The damages actually
sustained must be proved.4 17
The plaintiffs also argued that Eastern's actions entitled
them to punitive damages. This argument was based both
on the Warsaw Convention itself and on their state law
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. The court held that the Warsaw Convention did not
create an independent cause of action for willful miscon-
duct which authorized recovery for punitive damages.
The intent of the Convention to provide compensatory
damages suggested that it would be inconsistent to allow
punitive damages, which serve a purpose very different
from compensating victims. The Convention also
preempts a claim by airline passengers seeking punitive
damages under state law for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.4 I The appeals court found no case gov-
erned by the Convention in which a court awarded
punitive damages, and the court declined to depart from
this uniformity. On remand, the trial court was to deter-
mine the question of whether the facts showed willful mis-
conduct, thus removing the liability limitations on
compensatory damages in the Convention.41 9
411; Id.






The case of Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd.42 presented the
question whether international air carriers lose the benefit
of a limitation on damages for passenger injury or death
provided by the Warsaw Convention if they fail to provide
notice of that limitation in the ten-point type size required
by the Montreal Agreement. On September 1, 1983, over
the Sea of Japan, a military aircraft of the Soviet Union
destroyed a Korean Airlines jet en route from New York
to Seoul, South Korea. All aboard were killed, and the
families of the victims filed wrongful death actions against
Korean Airlines in several federal district courts. These
suits were transferred for pretrial proceedings to the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia. All parties agreed
that their rights were governed by the Warsaw
Convention.4 2 '
The controversy centered around the per-passenger
damages limitation for personal injury or death. The
Convention fixed the limit at approximately $8,300, but
the Montreal Agreement raised the amount to $75,000.422
In addition to providing higher damage limitations, the
Montreal Agreement required carriers to give passengers
written notice of the Convention's damage limitations in
print no smaller than ten-point type. The notice of the
Convention's liability rules printed on Korean Airlines'
passenger tickets for the flight in question appeared in
only eight-point type.423 The plaintiffs sought a declara-
tion that this discrepancy deprived Korean Airlines of the
benefit of the damages limitation. 2 The district court
denied the motion, finding that neither the Warsaw Con-
vention nor the Montreal Agreement prescribes that the
sanction for failure to provide the required form of notice
42o 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989).
id. at 1678.
422 Id. The Montreal Agreement is an agreement among carriers executed in




88 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [56
results in the elimination of the damage limitation.42 5
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the conflict among the circuits.426 Plaintiffs conceded that
the Montreal Agreement imposed no sanctions for failure
to comply with its ten-point type requirement. They ar-
gued, however, that such a requirement was created by a
combined reading of the Montreal Agreement and the
Warsaw Convention. Plaintiffs first argued that Article 3
of the Warsaw Convention removed the protection of lim-
ited liability if the carrier fails to provide adequate notice
of the Convention's liability limitation in its passengers'
tickets. In addition, plaintiffs asserted that the Montreal
Agreement's ten-point type requirement supplied the
standard of adequate notice under Article 3.427
The Supreme Court held that the Warsaw Convention
did not eliminate the limitation of damages for passenger
injury or death as sanctions for failure to provide ade-
quate notice of that limitation.428 It found nothing in Ar-
ticle 3, nor anywhere else in the Convention, which
imposed a sanction for failure to provide an adequate
statement. The only sanction in Article 3 appears in the
42 Id.
426 In addition to the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit was in disagreement with
the District of Columbia Circuit.
427 Id. at 1679.
4"8 Id. at 1679-80. The court stated some important aspects of the Warsaw
Convention:
[A] passenger ticket . . . shall contain the following particulars: (a)
[tihe place and date of issue; (b) [tihe place of departure and of des-
tination; (c) the agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier
may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of neces-
sity, and that if he exercises that right, the alteration shall not have
the effect of depriving the transportation of its international charac-
ter; (d) the name and address of the carrier or carriers; (e) a state-
ment that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to
liability established by the Convention .... [t]he absence, irregular-
ity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not affect the existence or the
validity of the contract of transportation, which shall nonetheless be
subject to the rules of [the] convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier
accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered
he shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of [the]
Convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Id. (quoting the Warsaw Convention).
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second clause of Article 3(2). This provision subjects a
carrier to unlimited liability if it accepts a passenger
whose passenger ticket has not been delivered.42 9 Several
courts, however, have equated non-delivery of a ticket
with the delivery of a ticket in a form that fails to provide
adequate notice of the Warsaw limitations. The entire
second sentence of Article 3(2) is rendered implausible by
the first sentence, which specifies that the irregularity of
the passenger ticket "shall not affect the existence or the
validity of the contract of transportation, which shall
nonetheless be subject to the rules of this Convention."
The Supreme Court stated "it is clear from this that (1) an
'irregularity' does not prevent a document from being a
'passenger ticket'; and (2) that an 'irregularity' in the pas-
senger ticket does not eliminate the contractual damages
limitation provided for by the Convention." 43 0 There-
fore, a delivered document does not fail to qualify as a
passenger ticket and does not cause forfeiture of the dam-
ages limitation merely because it contains a defective
notice.45
The proposition that delivering a defective ticket is
equivalent to failure to deliver a ticket produces an absurd
result. A carrier should not be entitled to avail itself of
the provisions of the Convention which exclude or limit
its liability when a ticket defect fails to give the passenger
proper notice of those provisions. There is no textual ba-
sis for limiting the "defective ticket is no ticket" principle
to that particular defect. Thus, the limitation of liability
would also be eliminated if the carrier failed to comply,
for example, with the requirement of Article 3(l)(d) that
the ticket contain the address of the carrier.43 2
Further, the Supreme Court found that the use of 8-
point type instead of 10-point for the liability limitation
notice was not so great a shortcoming as to prevent a doc-
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ument from being considered a ticket. In addition, non-
delivery of the ticket cannot be equated with the delivery
of a ticket in a form that fails to provide the notice re-
quired under the Convention. The delivered document
does not fail to qualify as a passenger ticket and does not
cause forfeiture of the damage limitation merely because
it contains a defective notice.433
F. Federal Preemption
In Floyd v. Eastern Airlines,43 4 the Eleventh Circuit found
that, where both state law and the Warsaw Convention al-
low recovery for alleged injuries, the Convention pre-
empts those aspects of the state law claims which are in-
consistent with it.43 5 Accordingly, since the Convention
provides the exclusive avenue for recovery for passengers
involved in any "accident" within the meaning of the
Convention, all state law claims are barred. The court,
however, declined to speculate further on whether the
Convention entirely pre-empts state law causes of action
once its provisions are triggered by an "accident" within
the meaning of the Convention. The engine failure in
question was an "accident" within the meaning of the
Convention, and the court determined that the Conven-
tion provided recovery for mental injuries unaccompa-
nied by physical impact.4 6 Where the Convention
applies, it preempts any inconsistent state law provi-
sions.437 The defendant, Eastern, was entitled to invoke
the $75,000.00 per passenger liability limitation and the
other provisions of the Convention. Therefore, to the ex-
tent that the cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress recognized under state law conflicted
with the cause of action under the Convention, Florida
43" Id.
4-, 872 F.2d 1462 (11 th Cir. 1989). For further disucssion of this case, see supra
notes 412-419.
41 Id.
436 Id. at 1481-82.




In Rodriguez v. Taca International Airlines,43 9 plaintiffs
were passengers on a Taca International (Taca) flight
when they were allegedly injured while landing in a rain-
storm. Plaintiffs' claims were governed by the Warsaw
Convention, as supplemented by the Montreal Agreement
(hereinafter Warsaw-Montreal). Since the plaintiffs were
engaged in international travel, Warsaw-Montreal was
applicable.
Warsaw-Montreal imposes liability on a carrier without
fault for injuries to passengers such as the plaintiffs, who
are engaged in international travel. Warsaw-Montreal
also imposes a limitation on the amount of damages
($75,000 per passenger) for which the carrier may be lia-
ble. The damage limitations, however, can be voided
upon proof of willful misconduct by the carrier.44 °
If the damage issue were tried first and the damages
found by a jury were less than $75,000 per claimant, then
any willful misconduct issue would be moot. All of the
expense and efforts devoted to trying to discover and
prove or disprove alleged willful misconduct would be ob-
viated. The court held that there was no reason for the
court and the parties to be burdened with extensive and
costly liability discovery where the complainants could re-
cover their damages without proof of fault. The district
court considered the nature of the incident and the dam-
ages involved and bifurcated the issue of liability from
damages, since it was clearly the most expeditious, eco-
nomical, and convenient means of proceeding in the
action.4 4
4s Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1481-82.
4.. 21 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,807 (E.D. La. 1988).
44.. id. at 17,807.
441I Id.
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